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CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS AND THE

"GENERAL

UTILITIES RULE"
by

William H. Lyons*
ECTION 336(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 provides
that, subject to certain exceptions, 2 a corporation does not recognize
gain or loss when it distributes property to its shareholders in connection with the complete liquidation of the corporation. 3 This nonrecognition rule first appeared in 1919 in the Treasury Regulations 4 and
continued as an administrative rule until it was codified in section 336(a)
of the 1954 Code. 5 Congress does not appear, however, to have pondered
the rule's appropriateness. Although the rule has undergone significant
legislative 6 and judicial 7 erosion since enactment, Congress has apparently
* B.A., Colby College; J.D., Boston College Law School. Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Nebraska College of Law.
1. I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982): "(a) GeneralRule.-Except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section and in section 453B (relating to disposition of installment obligations), no gain
or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property in complete
liquidation."
2. The present statutory exceptions are: Id. § 453B (relating to disposition of installment obligations); id. § 336(b) (relating to disposition of LIFO inventory); id. § 1245, as
amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 [hereinafter cited as
Tax Reform Act of 19841 (relating to gain from disposition of certain depreciable property);
id § 1250, as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984 (relating to gain from disposition of
certain depreciable real property); id. § 47, as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984 (relating
to recapture of investment tax credit).
3. Prior to 1982, § 336(a) applied to partial as well as complete liquidations. See infra
note 5.
4. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 547 (1919).
5. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 336(a), Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 106 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as 1954 Code]. As originally enacted, § 336(a) provided: "(a) General
Rule.-Except as provided in section 453(d) (relating to disposition of installment obligations), no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property in
partial or complete liquidation." Id. The nonrecognition rule embodied in § 336(a) is also
embodied in a companion provision, I.R.C. § 337(a) (1982). Section 337(a) provides that,
subject to certain exceptions, a liquidating corporation does not recognize gain or loss when
it sells its assets as part of a plan of liquidation. Since § 336(a) provided that, as a general
rule, corporations would not recognize gain or loss as a result of making liquidating distributions of property to shareholders, Congress concluded that a liquidating corporation should
not be deprived of the benefits of § 336(a) simply because the corporation elected to liquidate by selling its assets. These companion provisions will, for the sake of convenience,
generally be referred to as the "liquidation nonrecognition provisions."
6. See supra note 2.
7. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 1153, 75 L. Ed. 2d 130,
157 (1983) ("tax benefit rule" applies to corporations that make liquidating distributions
under § 336).
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never examined the fundamental question of whether the liquidating corporation should recognize gain or loss when it distributes appreciated or
depreciated property to its shareholders in liquidation.
The recent and well-publicized corporate takeover battles fought by Mobil Oil Company and E.I. DuPont de Nemours for control of Conoco Oil
Company, and by Mobil Oil Company and United States Steel for control
of Marathon Oil Company, attracted congressional attention to the Code's
partial liquidation provisions, which arguably provided tax incentives,
quite apart from any nontax reasons for engaging in such takeover battles. 8 Although the legislation that ultimately emerged from this congressional attention 9 did not change existing complete liquidation rules, the
attendant discussion raised questions as to the appropriateness of the liqui8. See statement of Rep. Fortney Stark in connection with his introduction of the Corporate Takeover Tax Act of 1982, H.R. 6295, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H1937
(daily ed. May 19, 1982):
The objective of the bill is to make the tax system more clearly neutral with
respect to corporate takeovers. The tax system should create neither special
benefits from nor impediments to mergers, acquisitions, or reorganizations.
Unfortunately, our present tax system creates a motive for takeovers quite
apart from any opportunity to improve the utilization of productive assets.
When the tax advantages of a takeover become significant it is as if the U.S.
Treasury provides a part of the funds used to finance the takeover.
128 CONG. REC. H1928 (daily ed. May 6, 1982) (statement of Rep. Stark). See generally A.
FELD, TAX POLICY AND CORPORATE CONCENTRATION (1982) (complete study of effects of
tax structure on corporate organization). Of course, arguments are made on the other side.
For example, a spokesperson for U.S. Steel, while conceding that the tax consequences of
the acquisition of Marathon Oil Company were important to U.S. Steel, denied that the
acquisition was undertaken primarily for tax purposes.
U.S. Steel's D.K. Frick also rejected the notion that a transaction of this size
would be undertaken primarily for tax reasons. Frick stated that the tax consequences were certainly important, but he stressed that any tax attributes pale
in the face of a $6 billion expenditure. "Obviously anybody that spends that
much for a company tries to have it come out as an asset to some extent for tax
purposes," said Frick.
Brown, Major Tax Savings Go With U.S. Steel-Marathon Merger, 14 TAX NOTES 562, 564
(Mar. 1, 1982).
9. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 222-228,
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 324 [hereinafter cited as TEFRA]. These
sections of TEFRA are generally referred to as the "mergers and acquisitions provisions."
Congressional interest in this area generated a number of pieces of proposed legislation.
See, e.g., H.R. 4562, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H6581 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1981)
(First Things First Credit Act of 1981) (proposed amending 1954 Code to deny interest
deduction for interest paid on funds borrowed for "unfriendly" takeover or attempted takeover); H.R. 5517, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H4406 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1982)
(proposed amending 1954 Code to deny interest deduction on any debt incurred in connection with a corporate takeover if the President determined that use of debt would be harmful
to nation's monetary policy); H.R. 5855, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H924 (daily
ed. Mar. 16, 1982) (proposed amending 1954 Code to deny interest deduction on any debt
incurred in connection with an "unfriendly" takeover); H.R. 5719, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. H664 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1982) (Merger Tax Act of 1982) (proposed a 15% excise
tax on certain acquisitions of business entities); H.R. 6295, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG.
REC. H 1937 (daily ed. May 6, 1982) (Corporate Takeover Tax Act); S.2547, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S5569 (daily ed. May 19, 1982). Of the proposed legislation, two bills
formed the basis for the "mergers and acquisitionsprovisions" of TEFRA: first, the Corporate Takeover Tax Act of 1982, H.R. 6295, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H1937
(daily ed. May 6, 1982); and second, an untitled bill introduced by Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, S.2547, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S5569 (daily ed. May 19, 1982).
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dation nonrecognition provisions.' 0 The Staff of the Senate Finance Committee is currently considering this question as part of a general study of
Subchapter C. "I
Thorough congressional examination of the appropriateness of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions, performed as a part of a reevaluation of
the theory and operation of Subchapter C, is long overdue. Congress, in
approaching this examination, must recognize that repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would work a fundamental change in our
system of income taxation. While no administrative, legislative, or judicial
articulation of a theoretical basis for the liquidation nonrecognition provisions has ever been made, that fact alone is not a sufficient reason to repeal
the provisions.
The early administrative rule was, very possibly, "derived from a simple
notion that there is no realization of appreciation in value at the corporate
level unless a corporation receives something or is relieved of a definite,
liquidated liability in exchange for its appreciated property."' 12 Such a notion was probably grounded in the belief that realization was a constitutional requirement. Now, however, realization is generally agreed to be a
matter of administrative convenience, rather than a constitutional mandate. Since the Constitution imposes no restraint on Congress's power to
make liquidation distributions taxable events for the liquidating corporation, Congress must decide whether to repeal the liquidation nonrecognition provisions. 13 As it considers this question, Congress must identify the
10. See Statement of David G. Glickman, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury, before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, House
Committee on Ways and Means (May 24, 1982), TAX NOTES MICROFICHE DATABASE Doc.
No. 82-6117.

11. Senator Robert Dole, Senate Finance Committee Chairman, directed the Finance
Committee Staff to study proposals for the revision and simplification of Subchapter C. See
Statement of Sen. Robert Dole, October 28, 1982, 17 TAX NOTES 494 (Nov. 8, 1982). On
September 22, 1983, the Senate Finance Committee Staff issued a preliminary report setting
forth recommendations for revisions to Subchapter C. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, 98TH CONG., lST SESS., THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. The
Staff Report drew heavily on the American Law Institute study of corporate taxation. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS
ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE

DISTRIBUTIONS (1982) [hereinafter cited as ALI PROPOSALS]. Among the recommendations
made by the Staff Report was a proposal to repeal the liquidation nonrecognition provisions.
On December 20, 1983, the Staff made available an unofficial draft of proposed legislation
that included a proposal to repeal the liquidation nonrecognition provisions.
12. ALI PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 105-06.
13. The problems created by the liquidation nonrecognition provisions could be eliminated by integration of the corporate and individual income taxes. Congress does not, however, seem inclined to embrace integration. Indeed, as discussed further in this Article, the
proposals for the reform of Subchapter C are directed toward strengthening the corporate
tax. Significantly, the ALI Proposals and the Staff Report both begin with the assumption
that Congress will not integrate the corporate and individual income taxes. See ALI PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 12, 104, 111-16; STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 4, 88-93. The
discussion in this Article is based on the assumption that the corporate and individual income taxes will not be integrated in the near future.
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problems created by the liquidation nonrecognition provisions so that an
appropriate response to such problems can be fashioned.
The Senate Finance Committee Staff, which has been primarily responsible for conducting the study of Subchapter C, has recommended complete repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions.' 4 In support of
its decision, the Staff argues that repeal would simplify Subchapter C, further the cause of tax neutrality, and broaden the tax base.' 5 Whatever the
merit of these arguments, they obscure the real problem, which is that the
present tax system creates the opportunity for a liquidating corporation's
distributees to take former corporate assets with a stepped-up basis without any corresponding taxation of the appreciation in the value of the assets. This opportunity exists because of the combined effect of the
liquidation nonrecognition provisions and the basis rules applicable to liquidating distributions.' 6 While complete repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would end this improper tax result, repeal is not the
appropriate response for all types of liquidations.
A corporate liquidation can be used to accomplish three types of transactions: (1) the termination of a business; (2) the continuation of a corporate business by the shareholders of the corporation in unincorporated
form; or (3) the transfer of a business to a third-party purchaser. If a liquidation involves the sale of the corporate assets to a third party, repeal of
the liquidation nonrecognition provisions is appropriate. The third-party
purchaser expects to get a cost basis in the assets. In order to justify the
stepped-up basis, the tax system should impose a tax on the liquidating
corporation on the appreciation in value of the assets. The additional tax
cost to the liquidating corporation could be the subject of a negotiated
adjustment to the asset purchase price. If a liquidation involves either termination of a business or continuation of a business by the former shareholders in an unincorporated form, the appropriate result is to give the
liquidating corporation an election. The liquidation could either be a taxable event for the liquidating corporation, with the result that the distributees would receive a stepped-up basis in the assets, or a nonrecognition
event for the liquidating corporation, in which case the distributees would
receive a carryover basis in the assets.
Any change to the liquidation nonrecognition provisions will cause a
substantial alteration in the operation of our existing system of corporate
income taxation. Complete repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions could have harsh consequences, particularly to the extent that repeal
would result in the imposition of a tax on inflation-created gains. Complete repeal would also raise questions relating to allowance of loss deductions on assets that have declined in value below their adjusted basis at the
time of the liquidation. In order to understand the magnitude of the
change involved in the repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions,
14. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 66-67.
15. Id.at 88-91.

16. I.R.C. § 334(a) (1982).

19851

CORPORA TE LIQ UIDA TIONS

1085

this Article briefly traces the history of the provisions. This Article also
examines the arguments for and the effects of complete repeal and the possible temporary or permanent measures that might be employed to lessen
the effects of repeal. Finally, this Article proposes an alternative to complete repeal.
I.

TREATMENT OF IN-KIND DISTRIBUTIONS IN LIQUIDATION

PRIOR TO

1954

Corporations, as separate taxable entities, have been subject to federal
income tax since the passage of the first revenue act' 7 by Congress pursuant to the sixteenth amendment.' 8 The first income tax regulations issued
by the Treasury Department 19 made no reference to gain or loss realization or recognition by a corporation that made either a liquidating or nonliquidating distribution of property in-kind to its shareholders with respect
to their stock. Following passage of the Revenue Act of 1918,20 the Treasury Department promulgated new Regulations, 2 1 first in a preliminary edition 22 and then in final, revised form. 23 The preliminary edition, like the
first Regulations, made no reference to realization or recognition of gain or
loss by the corporation upon an in-kind distribution to its shareholders.
The revised Regulations, however, provided: "No gain or loss is realized
by a corporation from the mere distribution of its assets in kind upon dissolution, however they may have appreciated or depreciated in value since
their acquisition."' 24 The identical language appeared in the Treasury
Regulations 25 issued under the Revenue Act of 1921,26 the Revenue Act of
1924,27 and the Revenue Act of 1926.28
With promulgation of the Revenue Act of 1928,29 the Treasury Department changed the Regulations slightly by replacing the words "upon dissolution" with the words "in partial or complete liquidation. '30 Apparently,
the only purpose for this amendment was to clarify that both partial liquidations and complete liquidations were covered by this rule. The identical
17.

Act of Oct. 3, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 166. A corporate income tax had

been imposed in 1909, prior to the ratification of the sixteenth amendment. See Pub. L. No.
61-5, 36 Stat. 112 (1909).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
19. Treas. Reg. 33 (1914).
20. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
21. Treas. Reg. 45 (1919).
22. Released on Feb. 25, 1919.
23. Released on Apr. 21, 1919.
24. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 547 (1919).
25. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 548 (1922) (Revenue Act of 1921); Treas. Reg. 65, art. 548 (1924)
(Revenue Act of 1924); Treas. Reg. 69, art. 548 (1926).(Revenue Act of 1926).
26. Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227.
27. Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253.
28. Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 9.
29. Pub. L. No. 70-562, 45 Stat. 791.
30. Treas. Reg. 74, art. 71 (1929). As amended, the provision read: "No gain or loss is
realized by a corporation from the mere distribution of its assets in kind in partial or complete liquidation, however they may have appreciated or depreciated in value since their
acquisition." Id.

1086

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

language appeared in the Treasury Regulations 3 1 issued under the Reve34
nue Act of 1932,32 the Revenue Act of 1934,33 the Revenue Act of 1936,
the Revenue Act of 1938, 35 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.36 In
1954 Congress enacted section 336, 3 7 codifying the rule that the Regulations had established administratively.
The Treasury Department never stated a theoretical basis for its administrative position that a liquidating distribution is not a realization event.
The Treasury Regulations, in all of their incarnations from 1919 to 1954,
did not explain why an in-kind liquidating distribution does not result in
38
corporate realization of gain or loss. A General Counsel Memorandum
issued in 1926 cites the Treasury Regulations 39 for the proposition that no
taxable gain results to a corporation that distributes its assets in-kind to its
shareholders in liquidation.4 0 Unfortunately, the Memorandum does not
discuss the rationale for the position taken in the Regulations and does not
present any independent basis for the conclusion that the liquidating distribution does not result in taxable gain to the distributing corporation.
Prior to the 1954 Code, courts generally accepted the position of the Regulations without comment or analysis, 4 1 thereby shedding no additional
light on the problem.
While they provided no supporting rationale, the Treasury Regulations
clearly embodied the conclusion that an in-kind liquidating distribution is
not the type of event that triggers realization of gain or loss to the distributing corporation. This nonrealization position was probably based on the
belief that realization could not occur unless the distributing corporation
received consideration for the distribution. This hypothesis is supported
by the reasoning of early administrative and judicial decisions relating to
taxation of corporations that made nonliquidating property distributions.
These early decisions distinguished between in-kind dividends, in which
the distributing corporations realized no gain or loss, 42 and cash dividends
satisfied by distribution of appreciated or depreciated property, which
31. Treas. Reg. 77, art. 71 (1933) (Revenue Act of 1932); Treas. Reg. 86, art. 22(a)-21
(1935) (Revenue Act of 1934); Treas. Reg. 94, art. 22(a)-21 (1936) (Revenue Act of 1936);
Treas. Reg. 101, art. 22(a)-21 (1939) (Revenue Act of 1938); Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-21
(1940) (Internal Revenue Code of 1939); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953) (Internal Revenue Code of 1939).
32. Pub. L. No. 72-154, 47 Stat. 169.
33. Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 680.
34. Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648.
35. Pub. L. No. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447.
36. Pub. L. No. 76-1, 53 Stat. I.
37. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3, 106.
38. G.C.M. 714, V-2 C.B. 72 (1926).
39. Treas. Reg. 69, art. 548 (1926).
40. G.C.M. 714, V-2 C.B. at 73.
41. See Lencard Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 58, 60 (1942); The Dill Mfg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1023, 1029 (1939); W.P. Fox & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 15
B.T.A. 115, 120 (1929); Chicago Binder & File Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 1002, 1005
(1926).
42. See First Utah Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 804, 810-11 (1929), a'd sub
noma.First Sav. Bank v. Burnet, 53 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Hollenberg Music Co. v.
Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 421, 425 (1927); see also Office Dec. 262, 1 C.B. 28 (1919) ("When
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caused the distributing corporation to realize and recognize gain or loss. 43
The decisions emphasized that the distributing corporation had to receive
some sort of consideration in order to trigger realization. 44 These early
45
decisions set the stage for General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,
with results, as one commentator
put it, hardly foreseeable by the United
46
States Supreme Court.
dividends are paid inLiberty Bonds having a market value below par the difference between
par and market is not an allowable deduction for income tax purposes.").
43. See Committee on Appeals Review, Recommendation 435, 4 C.B. 27 (1921) (corporation declared a dividend and subsequently satisfied dividend using depreciated securities,
difference between value of securities on March 1, 1913, and value on distribution allowed
as loss deduction to corporation). The Committee expressed the basis for its recommendation as follows:
At the date of the dividend the taxpayer unquestionably parted with title to
these securities and thus closed the transaction in them. Therefore, if the net
value of the securities at that date was less than their net value on March 1,
1913, the taxpayer, as a matter of fact, sustained a loss in their
distribution ...
Id.at 28; see also Bacon-McMillan Veneer Co. v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 556, 559 (1930)
(realization of gain due to use of appreciated property to satisfy dividend obligation); Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 1109, 1111 (1928) (loss sustained
upon discharge of obligation by means of distribution of depreciated property).
44. Perhaps the clearest articulation of the reasoning in these early decisions can be
found in First Utah Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 804 (1929), affd sub nom. First
Sav. Bank v. Burnet, 53 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1931). In First Utah the taxpayer distributed
depreciated securities to its shareholders as a dividend in-kind. The taxpayer claimed a loss
on the distribution equal to the difference between the cost of the securities and their market
value when they were distributed to the shareholders. The loss was denied, and the taxpayer
took the matter before the Board of Tax Appeals. Both the Board and the court of appeals
upheld the Commissioner's disallowance of the loss, and both focused on the argument that
§ 202(a) of the Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227, 229-31, required a "sale
or other disposition" of the securities before gain or loss could be recognized. The court of
appeals concluded that the distribution of the securities as an in-kind dividend was clearly
not a "sale." 53 F.2d at 920. Thus, the court stated:
The question remains whether the transfer, even if not a sale, responds to the
description of "other disposition of property," as employed in the statute.
This question is not free from doubt, but we feel constrained to hold that the
rule of ejusdem generis is applicable in construing the phrase, and that it relates only to such dispositions of property as are like sales. The transfer in
question was not of this kind for the stockholders of the bank paid no consideration for the stock received by them, nor was it received in payment of any
cash dividend previously declared by the bank.
Id. at 920-21. The court of appeals went on to cite Treas. Reg. 45, art. 547 (1919), and
successor provisions, stating:
No difference exists in principle between mere distributions of assets by corporations in dissolution and those not in dissolution. In both instances alike
such assets are merely distributed among the stockholders of the corporation
without the payment of any consideration therefor, and without the prior declaration of any cash dividend in payment of which the distribution is made.
53 F.2d at 921. Although the court of appeals acknowiedged the taxpayer's actual loss of
value, it held that no loss was realized for income tax purposes, concluding, somewhat cryptically, that "the income tax laws do not profess to embody perfect economic theory. They
have their own criteria which at times look to certain rather severe tests of liability and
exemption." Id.
45. 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
46. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C An Essay in Statutory Evolution and
Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 130 (1977).
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THE GENERAL UTILITIES "DOCTRINE"

General Utilities & Operating Co. purchased 20,000 of the 40,000 outstanding shares of the common stock of Islands Edison Company for
$2,000. Gillet & Company owned the remaining 20,000 shares of Islands
Edison common stock. Southern Cities Utilities Company desired to acquire all of the Islands Edison stock. The president of Southern Cities
discussed the acquisition of the Islands Edison stock with the presidents of
General Utilities and Gillet. The three presidents reached an understanding as to the terms and conditions under which Southern Cities might be
able to purchase the Islands Edison stock. GUllet was prepared to sell its
Islands Edison stock to Southern Cities directly, but General Utilities
wished, in order to avoid double taxation of the sale proceeds, to distribute
its Islands Edison stock to its shareholders who would, as individuals, sell
the stock to Southern Cities. The understanding reached by the three presidents included an agreement that General Utilities would distribute its
Islands Edison stock to its shareholders and that Southern Cities would
then have to acquire the Islands Edison stock from the General Utilities
shareholders.
Following these discussions, the board of directors of General Utilities
determined the value of the 20,000 shares of Islands Edison stock owned
by General Utilities to be $56.125 per share, for a total value of $1,122,500,
and adopted the following resolutions:
That a dividend in the amount of $1,071,426.25 be and it is hereby
declared on the Common Stock of this Company payable in Common
Stock of The Islands Edison Company at a valuation of $56.12 1/2 a
share, out of the surplus of the Company arising from the appreciation in the value of the Common Stock of the Islands Edison Company held by this Company, viz, $1,120,500.00, the payment of the
dividend to be made by the delivery to the stockholders of this Company pro rata, of certificates for the Common Stock of The Islands
Edison Company held by this Company at the rate of two shares4 7of
such stock for each share of Company Stock of this Corporation.
Pursuant to the resolution, General Utilities distributed 19,090 of its 20,000
shares of Islands Edison stock to its shareholders, retaining the remaining
910 shares. Following this distribution, all of the shareholders of General
Utilities sold their shares of Islands Edison stock to Southern Cities. General Utilities simultaneously sold its 910 shares of Islands Edison stock to
Southern Cities. The selling price for all of the shares was $56.125 per
share. General Utilities duly reported its gain on the sale of the 910 shares,
but reported no gain as a result of its distribution of the 19,090 shares to its
stockholders.
The Commissioner determined that the distribution of the 19,090 shares
gave rise to a taxable gain to General Utilities of $1,069,517.25. 4 8 General
Utilities petitioned the Board of Tax Appeals for a review of the Commis47. 296 U.S. at 202.
48. The amount of the taxable gain was computed as follows:
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sioner's determination. 49 The Commissioner argued that General Utilities, pursuant to its dividend resolution, became indebted to its
shareholders in the amount of $1,071,426.25, satisfied its debt using appreciated property, and therefore, realized a gain equal to the difference between the value of the property on the date of distribution and its basis.
Noting that the only issue before it was "whether petitioner realized taxable gain in declaring a dividend and paying it in the stock of another company at an agreed value per share, which value was in excess of the cost of
the stock to petitioner," 50 the Board found in favor of General Utilities.
The Board distinguished those early cases in which a nonliquidating distribution was found to have caused realization, arguing that those cases involved declarations of dividends that were stated in definite amounts prior
to payment of the dividends by distributions in-kind, whereas the General
5
Utilities dividend declaration initially declared a dividend in-kind. '
19,090
x $56.125
$1,071,426.25
19,090
x $ 0.10
$1,909.00
$1,071,426.25
- 1,909.00
$1,069,513.25

Shares Sold
Per Share Purchase Price
Total Purchase Price
Shares Sold
Per Share Basis
Total Basis
Purchase Price
Basis
Gain

Id. at 202-03.
49. General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 934 (1934).
50. Id.
51. The Board cited Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 1109
(1928) (loss sustained upon discharge of dividend obligation by means of distribution of
depreciated property); Bacon-McMillan Veneer Co. v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 556 (1930)
(realization of gain due to use of appreciated property to satisfy dividend obligation); and
First Utah Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 804, aff'd sub nom. First Sav. Bank v.
Burnet, 53 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (no loss allowed on distribution of securities as dividend in-kind). The Board distinguished Callananand Bacon-McMillanfrom General Utilities based on the dividend resolutions adopted in each case. The distinction between the
resolution in Callananand the resolution in General Utilities is clear, since in Callananthe
company declared a cash dividend with no mention of the property that was later distributed
in partial satisfaction of the cash amount owed. The distinction between the resolution in
Bacon-McMillan and the resolution in General Utilities is, however, not at all clear. In Bacon-McMillan the resolution provided: "[T]hat a fifty per cent dividend be declared, and
made payable in Liberty Loan Bonds in denominations of $1,000.00 each at their market
value this date, and all odd hundreds of dollars and cents in cash." Id.at 557. In General
Utilitiesthe resolution provided: "[T]hat a dividend in the amount of $1,071,426.25 be and it
is hereby declared. . . payable in Common Stock of The Islands Edison Company ..
29 B.T.A. at 936. The Board of Tax Appeals in Bacon-MeMillan concluded:
On the question of dividends payable in Liberty Loan Bonds, the real controversy centers around the interpretation of the resolution of the board of directors in declaring the dividend. If the resolution be interpreted as declaring an
ordinary dividend of a definite amount and then providing that that dividend
should be paid in Liberty bonds, we think that [the distribution of the Liberty
Bonds constituted a realization of gain by the corporation.]
20 B.T.A. at 559. In General Utilities the Board of Tax Appeals stated: "Where the method
of payment is prescribed a stockholder is not entitled to payment in some other form." 29
B.T.A. at 940. Since the resolution in Bacon-McMillan prescribes the method of payment in
almost the same words as the resolution in General Utilities,is it possible to reconcile these
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Based on its analysis of prior cases, the Board concluded "that, where the
dividend resolution imposes only the obligation to distribute in kind and it
'5 2
is discharged in that way, no gain or loss results to the corporation.
The Commissioner appealed to the Fourth Circuit, asserting not only
the cash dividend argument raised before the Board, but also an alternative argument that General Utilities should be taxed on the shareholders'
sale of the 19,090 shares because General Utilities had in fact sold the
stock. Foreshadowing the argument in Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co.,53 the Commissioner argued that General Utilities did everything except actually consummate the sale of the shares and thus should not escape
taxation on the sale by the device of a dividend distribution to its shareholders. The court of appeals held that the Board correctly decided the
dividend question, but reversed
the Board on the basis of the Commis54
sioner's new argument.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Commissioner made
a third argument, which asserted that, by making the appreciated value of
the Islands Edison stock available to its shareholders, General Utilities ef55
fectively realized that appreciation and should be taxed on it.
The Court
did not respond directly to this new argument and held only that the court
of appeals erred in hearing the Commissioner's second argument because
that argument was not raised before the Board. 56 Presumably the same
rationale would apply to the Commissioner's realization argument, since it
was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court, but regrettably the
Court's opinion is silent on that point. The Court reversed the court of
57
appeals and affirmed the result reached by the Board.
The Court's holding in General Utilities is not a model of clarity:
Both the tribunals below rightly decided that petitioner derived no
taxable gain from the distribution among its stockholders of the Islands Edison shares as a dividend. There was no sale; assets were not
used to discharge indebtedness.
The second ground of objection, although sustained by the [court of
appeals], was not presented to or ruled upon by the Board. The petition for review relied wholly upon the first point; and, in the circumstances, we think the [court of appeals] should have considered no
two decisions? One might argue that the resolution in Bacon-McMillan was for a fixed
amount in no way dependent upon the value of the Liberty Bonds, while in General Utilities
the resolution was for a dividend of the stock in-kind, with the amount being mentioned
only to fix the value of the Islands Edison stock. A better view, however, is that, to the
extent that Bacon-McMillan held that a resolution naming the amount of a dividend and
then providing that the dividend will be paid in property would trigger realization of gain to
the distributing corporation upon the distribution of the property, Bacon-McMillan has been
overruled by subsequent decisions. See Mintz & Plumb, Dividends in Kind-The Thunderbolt and the New Look, 10 TAX L. REV. 41, 44 n.15 (1954)
52. 29 B.T.A. at 939.
53. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
54. Helvering v. General Utils. & Operating Co., 74 F.2d 972, 977 (4th Cir. 1935).
55. Brief for Respondent at 18, 26, General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296
U.S. 200 (1935).
56. 296 U.S. at 206.
57. Id. at 207.
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other.5 8
Commentators have interpreted this language in two opposite ways. The
first interpretation, adopted by most commentators, is that the Court simply did not consider the Commissioner's realization argument at all, holding only that on the specific facts of General Utilities the distribution of
appreciated property as a dividend did not generate discharge of indebtedness income to the distributing corporation.5 9 The second interpretation is
that the Court considered and rejected the Commissioner's realization argument, holding that the appreciation in value of corporate assets distributed as a dividend cannot be taxable to the distributing corporation60
because such a distribution does not constitute a realization of income.
Although the rationale for the second interpretation is not set forth by the
commentator, the rationale must be that after the Board and the Court
decided that the Islands Edison stock was distributed as a dividend in-kind
and not in satisfaction of a cash dividend, both the Board and the Court
had to decide that the distribution itself was not a realization event. The
difficulty with this argument is that both the Board and the Court could
have assumed that mere distribution was not a realization event without
actually deciding that issue. As Bittker and Eustice point out, "there is a
big difference between answering'6 a question and assuming an answer in
the absence of timely argument." '
Although the vast majority of commentators agreed that, properly read,
the Supreme Court's opinion did not address the question of whether a
58. Id.at 206.
59. One commentator stated: "Closely read, the opinion does little more than reject the

argument that when a corporation declares a dividend in a specified dollar amount and then
pays it by distributing appreciated property of equivalent value, it realizes income by virtue
of the doctrine that a discharge of indebtedness yields income." Clark, supra note 46, at 130;
see also Paul, Ascertainment of "Earningsor Profits"forthe Purpose of Determining Taxability of CorporateDistributions,51 HARV. L. REV. 40, 57 (1937) (interpreting tax law on corporate distributions); Raum, Dividends in Kind-Their Tax Aspects, 63 HARV. L. REV. 593, 59799 (1950) (discussing General Utilities holding).
60. Another commentator stated:
Whatever one may feel about the merit of (the Supreme Court's decision in
General Utilities], it clearly upholds the view of the Board that the appreciated
value of a dividend in kind does not constitute income to the distributing
corporation ...
Nevertheless, it is still maintained that the General Utilities case does not
stand for the proposition that appreciated value of corporate assets distributed
as a dividend in kind cannot be taxable income. The argument. . . is based
on the dubious theory that the Court, ignoring the commissioner's last arguments, decided the case solely on the question of whether the dividend has
been declared in terms of dollars or in terms of property. The contention completely misses the point that even if the Court did refuse to note the Commissioner's belated attempt to revive an argument he had conceded at trial, its
decision that the dividend was in terms of property rather than dollars was
significant only because a dividend ofproperty was regarded as incapableof constituting realization ofincome to the corporation.
Albrecht, "Dividends"and "Earningsor Profits,"7 TAX L. REV. 157, 212-13 (1952) (emphasis
added).
61. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
7.21, at 7-51 n.126 (4th ed. 1979).
SHAREHOLDERS
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distribution of appreciated property is a realization event for a distributing
corporation, the courts have not reached the same conclusion. Prior to the
enactment of section 311 (a), 62 the lower federal courts, with a few exceptions, 63 cited the Court's opinion in General Utilities without comment or
analysis for the proposition that the distribution of a dividend in-kind
would not cause realization of gain or loss by the distributing corporation.64 General Utilities has also been cited, without comment, as support
for the proposition that a liquidating corporation does not realize gain or
loss upon distribution of its property to its shareholders. 65 Such was the
state of the law as Congress began the process of drafting the 1954 Code.
III.

THE 1954 CODE

When Congress began the revision of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, it had available for its consideration a substantial and somewhat
confusing body of law relating to the taxation of corporations making
property distributions to shareholders with respect to their stock. By enacting sections 336(a) and 31 l(a) in the 1954 Code, Congress ended most
litigation on the issue of corporate realization of gain or loss on distributions to its shareholders. 66 An examination of the records of congressional
action relating to the 1954 Code indicates that Congress did not substantively consider whether the pre-1954 Code results, codified in sections
336(a) and 311(a) were proper.
62. I.R.C. § 31 1(a) (1982) provides: "(a) GeneralRule.-Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section and section 453B, no gain or loss shall be recognized to a
corporation on the distribution, with respect to its stock, of--(I) its stock (or rights to acquire
its stock), or (2) property."
63. See Commissioner v. Godley's Estate, 213 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1954), in which the
court of appeals, discussing the Supreme Court's decision in General Utilities stated:
Because of procedural points involved and the sequence of the Commissioner's argument before the Board of Tax Appeals, the Fourth Circuit, and
the Supreme Court, the scope of the holding of the General Utilities case is
uncertain. There is no doubt, however, that the case has received judicial and
administrative acceptance as standing for the proposition that a corporation
does not realize income from the distribution of property which has appreciated in value over its costs.
Id. at 531.
64. See National Gasoline Corp. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1955); J.A.
Folger & Co. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. 710 (1945); National Carbon Co. v. Commissioner,
2 T.C. 57 (1943).
65. See Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1041, 1046 (1959).
66. Some litigation did continue, most notably that involving the question of whether
the tax benefit rule should be applied notwithstanding the general rule of nonrecognition
established by I.R.C. §§ 311(a) and 336(a). Ballou Constr. v. United States, 81-2 U.S.T.C.
9638 (D. Kan. 1981); Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440 (1975),
afftd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978); Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, 36 T.C. 1027 (1961),
aft'd,324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hillsboro Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 1153, 75 L. Ed. 2d 130, 157 (1983), ended the debate
over whether the tax benefit rule overrides § 336(a). Continued litigation of the question of
when the rule is to be applied appears likely in light of the Court's holding that "the tax
benefit rule ordinarily applies to require the inclusion of income when events occur that are
fundamentally inconsistent with an earlier deduction." Id. at 1138, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 139.

1985]

CORPORA TE LIQ UIDA TIONS

1093

As initially introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R. 8300,67

which evolved into the 1954 Code as finally enacted by Congress, dealt in
the same section with the income tax consequences to the distributing corporation of both nonliquidating and liquidating distributions. 68 The drafters of proposed section 308 did not explain why they elected to put the
provisions governing both liquidating and nonliquidating distributions
into a single section. The combining of these provisions could be read as
an indication that the drafters viewed liquidating and nonliquidating distributions as essentially the same for income tax purposes. Such a view
would have been compatible with the view expressed by the court in First
Savings Bank v. Burne. 69 In First Savings the court stated that it saw no
difference in principle between liquidating and nonliquidating distributions because "[i]n both instances alike such assets are merely distributed
among the stockholders of the corporation without the payment of any
consideration therefore ....-70 Unfortunately, the record does not indicate whether the drafters of proposed section 308 were influenced by the
rationale of First Savings.
The two published House reports on H.R. 8300 do not shed much additional light on the rationale of the drafters. Both the report of the House
Committee on Ways and Means7 ' and the Detailed Discussion of Techni67. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 100 CONG. REC. 2957 (1954).
68. H.R. 8300, § 308, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 100 CONG. REC. 2957 (1954) [hereinafter
referred to as proposed § 308]. As initially drafted proposed § 308 provided:
Sec. 308. CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS OF STOCK, SECURITIES,
AND PROPERTY-EFFECT ON CORPORATION.
(a) In General.-Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), no gain or
loss shall be recognized to a corporation upon the distribution, with respect to
its stock, of its participating or nonparticipating stock (or of rights to acquire
such stock) or upon such a distribution of securities or property.
(b) LIFO Inventory.-In the case of a distribution of inventory with respect to which a corporation is using the elective method provided by section
472 in the computation of its income, gain shall be recognized to the distributing corporation in an amount equal to the excess of the amount at which such
inventory would have been included for the taxable year of such distribution
in such computation under a method authorized by section 471 over the
amount at which such assets would have been included pursuant to section
472. For this purpose, the amount determined under section 471 shall be computed by the use of the retail method of valuing inventory if the distributing
corporation used such method in computing its inventory under section 472
and in all other cases by the use of the method of cost or market, whichever is
lower.
(c) PropertySubject to Liability.-In any case in which property subject to
a liability in an amount in excess of the adjusted basis thereof is distributed by
a corporation, gain shall be recognized to the distributing corporation witA
respect to such property measured by the excess of the amount of the liability
over the adjusted basis.
(d) Liquidations.-Subsection(a) (but not subsections (b) or (c)) shall apply to a distribution in partial or complete liquidation as discussed in section
336.
69. 53 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
70. Id. at 921.
71. REPORT OF HOUSE COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017 [hereinafter
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cal Provisions of the Bill appended to the Ways and Means Report 72 suggest that the drafters incorrectly assumed that General Utilities decided that
corporate distributions of property to shareholders with respect to their
stock were not realization events. Since neither the Ways and Means Report nor the House Technical Discussion contains any analysis of the General Utilities decision, a good argument can be made that the drafters
concluded that they were bound by what they perceived to be the rule of
General Utilities. If in fact the drafters believed that General Utilities was
dispositive on the realization issue, then the following language in the
Ways and Means Report indicates that the drafters agreed with the case's
result: "Your committee's liquidation rules conform to its policy of not
imposing a tax until there has been an economic realization of gain. Accordingly, unrealized appreciation in the value of property received upon
the liquidation of a corporation will not be taxed to the shareholder or the
corporation. '73 Implicit in the reference to unrealized appreciation is the
premise that the liquidating distribution is not a realization event. The
Ways and Means Report, however, does not explain why a liquidating distribution is not a realization event.
If we assume that the drafters grounded the nonrecognition rule of proposed section 308 in a misplaced reliance on General Utilities, another and
potentially more serious error arises from the drafters' reading of General
Utilities. The drafters apparently assumed that the General Utilities "rule"
applied to liquidating distributions as well as to nonliquidating distributions. Since General Utilities involved a nonliquidating distribution, the
Court had no occasion to consider the question of whether a liquidating
distribution is a realization event. Even if General Utilities were binding
on the question of nonliquidating distributions, it clearly was not binding
on the question of liquidating distributions. The language of the Ways
and Means Report on the liquidation provision 74 arguably may indicate
that the drafters were not relying on General Utilities to support the noncited as WAYS AND MEANS REPORT]. The Ways and Means Report contains the following

statement on proposed § 308:
The bill incorporates in the statute a rule derived from the Supreme Court
decision in General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvein . (296 U.S. 200) that a
corporation does not realize a gain by reason of a distnbution of its property
even though the value of the property distributed may exceed its cost to the

corporation.
Id.at 37.
72. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4137 [hereinafter cited at HOUSE TECHNICAL DISCUSSION]. The House Tech-

nical Discussion contains a statement similar to the statement in the Ways and Means
Report:

Section 308 is intended to provide statutory rules governing the tax consequences at the corporate level of distributions of stock, securities, or property
to shareholders of a corporation. While this section has no counterpart under
the 1939 Code, certain court decisions have been considered to hold that a
corporation realizes no gain or loss upon a distribution of property to its
shareholders.

Id. at 90.
73. WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 71, at 38.
74. Id.
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recognition provision of proposed section 308(d). If such as argument is
correct, we are left with a provision that apparently was based on the theory that a liquidating distribution does not trigger realization of gain or
loss, yet we have no explanation of why no realization occurs.
When considering H.R. 8300, the Senate separated the provisions treating current, nonliquidating, distributions from the provisions treating liquidating distributions. The fact that the Senate elected, unlike the House,
to place the provisions relating to liquidating and nonliquidating distributions in separate sections suggests that the Senate viewed the two types of
distributions differently. Review of the Report of the Senate Committee
on Finance 75 and the Detailed Discussion of the Technical Aspects of the
Bill appended to the Finance Committee Report 76 suggests that the Senate,
while reaching the same result reached by the House, had a different reason for providing for nonrecognition in connection with liquidating distributions. The Senate Technical Discussion of proposed section 336 stated
that the provision was derived from the Treasury Regulations. 77 Although
the Senate Technical Discussion correctly identified the source of the rule
set forth in proposed section 336, the discussion did not state the rationale
for the rule.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the process of adopting the 1954
Code presented Congress with an opportunity for a critical review of the
body of judicial and regulatory law relating to the tax consequences to
distributors of liquidating distributions to shareholders. Congress, however, elected to codify the results of the judicial and regulatory decisions
75. REPORT OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621 [hereinafter cited as

Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.
FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT].

76. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4785 [hereinafter cited as SENATE TECHNICAL DISCUSSION].
77. The Finance Committee Report on proposed § 311 (nonliquidating distributions)
provides:
Your committee follows the house bill in retaining
the general rules of present law with respect to current distribution by a corporation to its shareholders. Your committee also incorporates into the statute the rule derived from
the Supreme Court decision in General Utilities and Operating Company v.
Helvering (296 U.S. 200) that a corporation does not realize gain by reason of
a distribution of its property even though the value of the property distributed
may exceed its cost to the corporation.
FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supranote 75, at 46. This language, which is virtually identical to the language of the Ways and Means Report, reflects the influence of GeneralUtilities. Contrast, however, the language of the Senate Technical Discussion dealing with
proposed § 336:
This section, for which there is no statutory counterpart under existing law,
corresponds to section 308(a) of the House bill and provides that no gain or
loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property in
kind in partial or complete liquidation. This rule is derived- friom-se9tion
39.22(a)-20 of Regulations 118.
SENATE TECHNICAL DISCUSSION, supra note 76, at 258. The Senate Finance Committee
apparently understood that it was proposing to codify the rule that had existed in the Treasury Regulations since 1919. Although the Senate Technical Discussion makes reference to
proposed § 308(a) of the House bill, which covered both liquidating and nonliquidating
distributions, the Senate Technical Discussion clearly does not seek to explain proposed
§ 336 as being required by General Utilities.
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without considering the appropriateness of those results. Since the adoption of the 1954 Code, Congress has never given this important area the
78
attention it deserves.
IV.

SHOULD A LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTION BE A
RECOGNITION EVENT?

Congress now has the opportunity to give the liquidation nonrecognition provisions the attention they deserve. Congress in considering
whether to repeal these provisions, must address two questions. First,
could any valid constitutional objections to repeal be raised? The answer
to this question turns on whether the sixteenth amendment requires realization of gain as a prerequisite to its recognition, or whether the requirement is merely a matter of administrative convenience. Second, if no
constitutional problem exists, is liquidation an appropriate event to trigger
both a tax on the appreciation in value of corporate assets and a loss deduction for depreciation in value of such assets? The answer to this question turns on an understanding of what problems the liquidation
nonrecognition provisions create and how repeal would help resolve those
problems.
A.

Is Realization Required by the Sixteenth Amendment?

The question of a possible sixteenth amendment problem can be disposed of quickly. In Eisner v. Macomber79 the Supreme Court stated that
the sixteenth amendment requires realization, which the Court defined as
the severance of gain from capital. The Court has since discarded this
definition of realization. Instead the question has become whether some
event has occurred that marks an appropriate time to tax the appreciated
value of an asset.80 The Court, however, has never expressly repudiated
that portion of Eisner v. Macomber that made realization, however defined,
a constitutional requirement. 8 ' The lack of repudiation could be said to
82
support the argument that realization is a constitutional requirement,
78. Shortly after the enactment of the 1954 Code, Congress commissioned a study of the
federal income tax laws. In 1959 a collection of reports comprising this study was published.
Included in this collection was the seminal article by James Lewis proposing fundamental
change in the tax treatment of liquidating corporations. Lewis, A ProposedNew Treatment
for CorporateDistributionsand Sales in Liquidations,3 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND
MEANS TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1643 (1959). The Lewis article was not, however, the

subject of any congressional discussion.
79. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
80. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 68 (1962); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
81. When the government has specifically asked the Court to overrule Eisner v. Macomber, the Court has avoided taking such action by distinguishing Eisner v. Macomber
from the case before the Court. See Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604, 607 (1943); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 394 (1942). Thus, Eisner v. Macomber may still have some
vitality at least to the extent of holding that realization is required by the sixteenth amendment. See Lowndes, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 151, 176
(1964).
82. The question of whether realization is constitutionally required has persisted, pri-
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even though lower federal courts have not been receptive to the idea 83 and
most commentators agree that realization is a matter of administrative
84
convenience.
Fortunately, even in the unlikely event that the sixteenth amendment
requires realization, that requirement is only of limited importance. As
one commentator explained:
The constitutional requirement of realization, if it ever made any
sense, did so only in connection with a tax on a gain from property
which could be regarded as a tax on the property itself if it was not
treated as a tax on income . . . A tax upon a gain which is not a
direct tax upon property does not have to be sustained under the sixteenth amendment. Consequently, even upon the assumption that realization is a constitutional prerequisite of income, such a gain need
not be realized to be constitutionally taxable.
As long as there is an adequate gain to sustain an income tax, it
would seem that the question of when this gain should be taxed, or
when it was realized for tax purposes, should be a matter of administrative convenience to be decided by Congress, rather than a constitu85
tional question whose ultimate resolution rests with the courts.
If the foregoing rationale is applied to the specific problem of the corporate liquidating distribution, when a corporation distributes its property in
liquidation any appreciation in value over the corporation's basis in such
property can be measured as of the date of the liquidating distribution. In
such a situation, the gain would be adequate to sustain an income tax.8 6
marily in the area of transfers of property by gift. The issuance of two Internal Revenue
Service rulings relating to the realization of gain by virtue of a gift of harvested wheat, I.T.
3910, 1948-1 C.B. 15, and a gift of cattle, I.T. 3932, 1948-2 C.B. 7, prompted a series of
articles discussing whether the government could impose an income tax on the donor on the
accrued gain at the time of the gift. Griswold, Charitable Gfts of Income and the Internal
Revenue Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. (1951); Bittker, CharitableGifts of Income and the Internal
Revenue Code: Another View, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1375 (1952); Griswold, In BriefReply, 65
HARV. L. REV. 1389 (1952); Roehner & Roehner, Realization: Administrative Convenienceor
ConstitutionalRequirement 8 TAX L. REV. 173 (1953). Similarly, the debate on the appropriateness of the exclusion for gifts embodied in § 102(a) prompted comment on the power
of Congress to impose an income tax on either the donor or the donee at the time of the gift.
See Mullock, The ConstitutionalProblem of Taxing Gifts as Income, 53 MINN. L. REV. 247
(1968); Del Cotto, The ConstitutionalProblem of Taxing Gifts as Income: A Reply to Professor Mullock, 53 MINN. L. REV. 259 (1968). A proposal to impose an income tax on unrealized appreciation in property at death, H.R. 8757, § 2(a), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), drew
strong criticism as being in violation of the sixteenth amendment. See Comment, Proposed
IRS § 84.: Income Taxation of UnrealizedAppreciation at Death: Unwise; Unwieldly: Unconstitutional,34 U. PiTT. L. REV. 23 (1972). But see Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized Gainsat
Death: An Evaluation of CurrentProposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 830 (1973) (favoring taxation of
unrealized gains upon death of taxpayer).
83. See Prescott v. Commissioner, 561 F.2d 1287, 1293 (8th Cir. 1977).
84. See Lowndes, supra note 81, at 173; Oberst, Reform of the Subchapter S Distribution
Rules. Repudiation of Section 311(a), 38 TAx L. REv. 79, 114-15 (1982); Roehner & Roehner, supra note 82.
85. Lowndes, supranote 81, at 172-73. But see Mullock, CurrentConceptionsof Taxable
Income-A Comment, 26 OHIo ST. L.J. 43 (1965) (disagrees with Lowndes article and supports realization requirement).
86. While the amount of the increase or decrease in the value of marketable securities
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Congress, therefore, should be free to decide, without regard to any constraints imposed by the sixteenth amendment, whether distributing corporations must realize and recognize such gains.
B. Is a LiquidatingDistributionan Appropriate Taxable Event?
1. Preliminary Comments
Even if no constitutional impediment bars a congressional decision to
repeal the liquidation nonrecognition provisions, the difficult question of
whether such action is appropriate still remains. The mere fact that the
liquidation nonrecognition provisions are not the product of careful congressional deliberation does not require the conclusion that the provisions
must be repealed. Indeed, the proposals to repeal the liquidation nonrecognition provisions raise fundamental questions about the extent to which
double taxation should be imposed. The provisions represent a longstanding administrative and statutory practice that should not be cast aside
without careful thought. Despite separate corporate and individual income taxes, in practice complete double taxation under these systems is not
imposed. Our two-tier tax system is in effect a compromise, under which
double taxation is imposed on ordinary earnings from regular business operations, but only a single tax, at the shareholder level, is imposed on extraordinary events, such as corporate liquidations. 87 Repeal of the
held by a liquidatin& corporation can be measured in relation to the corporation's adjusted
basis in such securities at the time of the liquidating distribution, any gains or losses determined in that manner are arguably merely paper gains or loses without sufficient economic
substance to justify taking them into account in computing tax liability. Although securities
values do fluctuate, if the Constitution does not require realization, the amount of gain or
loss can be calculated as of the date of distribution. The issue raised by such an argument,
therefore, is not whether such gain or loss can be recognized, but whether such gain or loss
should be recognized. Other types of gains, such as gain attributable to goodwill, might be
difficult to measure with accuracy and for that reason should, as discussed further, be treated
separately.
87. Reform of CorporateTaxation: Hearing Before Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FinanceHearingon Reform of Corporate
Tax] (statement of John S. Nolan). Why our corporate income tax has developed in such a
schizophrenic fashion is unclear. Professor Alvin Warren's article on the integration of the
individual and corporate income taxes suggests a possible explanation. Warren, The Relation and Integrationof Individualand CorporateIncome, 94 HARV. L. REV. 719 (1981). Professor Warren points out that initially corporations were viewed as separate t ixable entities
simply because they were legal entities. Id. at 719. If Congress shared this view in 1909,
adoption of the corporate income tax in that year might be explained as an att..mpt to insure
that corporations, as legal entities, would bear their fair share of the tax burden. As Professor Warren acknowledges, however, the view that the corporation is a separate taxable entity
merely because it is a separate legal entity "has generally given way to the view that the
burden of all taxes must ultimately fall on individuals." Id The modem view of the corporate income tax, according to Professor Warren, is that the tax is "a separate tax on corporate 'profits' (ite., the excess of a corporation's net income over the cost of its capital) or on
entrepreneurship." Id. Professor Warren's comments suggest that the development of our
corporate income tax system reflects the tension between the desire to use the corporate
income tax as a convenient means of raising revenue and the desire to make the tax system
as neutral as possible with regard to the decision to use a corporation as a vehicle for operating a business. The latter purpose produced the nonrecognition provisions embodied in
§§ 351, 336 & 337. The former purpose resulted in the double tax on the proceeds of the
normal business operations of corporations.
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liquidation nonrecognition provisions would work a fundamental change
in the operation of our tax system, regardless of that system's supporting
theory. The appropriate argument is not that Congress should give undue
weight to past history,8 8 but rather that Congress should only repeal the
consideration of all of
liquidation nonrecognition provisions after careful
89
the possible effects that could result from repeal.
Proponents of complete repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions argue that the provisions are the source of a number of problems in
our existing corporate income tax laws. While the provisions do create or
contribute to several problems, Congress needs to recognize that the most
serious problem is that taxpayers can, by utilizing the liquidation nonrecognition provisions and the liquidation basis provisions, step up the basis
of corporate assets without exposing the appreciation in the value of such
assets to taxation. Both the ALI Proposals9" and the Staff Report 9' begin
by proposing complete repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions.
This proposition is based on the potential benefits that would flow from
repeal. The principal arguments advanced in support of complete repeal
are as follows: (1) repeal would simplify Subchapter C; (2) repeal would
further the cause of tax neutrality; and (3) repeal would broaden the federal income tax base. These arguments, which are evaluated below, tend
to deflect attention from the real problem, which is the opportunity to get a
stepped-up basis without imposition of a corresponding tax. Although
complete repeal would resolve some problems, including the stepped-up
basis problem, complete repeal would also create new problems. For that
coureason, the less drastic approach of partial repeal of the provisions,
92
pled with an elective carryover basis option, is discussed below.
88. At least one commentator has advanced such an argument. See Finance Hearingon
Reform of Corporate Tax, supra note 87, at 154.
89. Ronald A. Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy,
made the point well:
The rules of corporate taxation are an integrated whole. If changes are made
to certain of the basic provisions-for example, the rule of General Utilitiesthose changes will reverberate throughout the system. Some provisions previously thought necessary to prevent abuse may no longer be relevant; others
may have to be redrawn and strengthened. Accordingly, we believe that a
fundamental restructuring must take into account all collateral consequences.
Finance Hearings on Reform of CorporateTax, supra note 87, at 28.
90. ALl Proposals, supra note 11, at 12, 104, 111-16. Although the ALl Proposals contemplate the possibility of partial integration of corporate and individual income taxes by
means of a shareholder credit based on the income tax paid by the corporation, Professor
Alvin Warren points out that the proposals really involve "refinement of the corporate tax as
an additional levy on corporate profits." Warren, supra note 87, at 720. Professor Warren's
article refers to the ALl FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C-CORPORATE DisTRIBUTIONS (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1979), but the Tentative Draft and the ALl Proposals adopt
the same philosophy of corporate taxation.
91. STAFF REPORT, supranote 11, at 4, 88-93. Although the Staff Report states that the
staff of the Senate Committee on Finance made no judgment as to the propriety of the
corporate level tax, the Staff Report clearly contemplates that the corporate level tax should
result in double taxation.
92. For purposes of considering whether the liquidation nonrecognition provisions
should be repealed, this Article assumes that the corporate income tax will continue as a
separate tax. The threshhold question of whether we should have a separate corporate in-
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The problem of the stepped-up basis with no corresponding tax liability
involves an ancillary issue. If accrued gain is to be subjected to taxation
before a step-up in basis will be permitted, is the liquidating corporation,
in all cases, the appropriate taxpayer? This issue raises the general problem of the proper role of the corporate income tax in our federal income
tax system. 93 Both the ALI Proposals 94 and the Staff Report 95 contemplate
strengthening the corporate income tax and would, therefore, require the
liquidating corporation to recognize the gain in all cases. This approach
would mean increased double taxation. To the extent that this change
would impose a double tax on inflation-created gain, some commentators
have argued that the result of strengthening the corporate income tax
would be the creation of an unreasonable tax burden. 96 While concern
about the role that the corporate income tax plays in the equitable distribution of the overall federal income tax burden is appropriate, 97 resolution
of this issue can be based on arguments that have been thoroughly set
forth in existing works. 98 Although the following discussion involves a
consideration of the extent to which the existing system of double taxation
should be strengthened, the focus of the discussion is the most appropriate
way to resolve the stepped-up basis problem.
2. Simplfication of Subchapter C
Proponents of repeal of sections 336 and 337 contend that repeal will
simplify Subchapter C in the following ways: (1) by eliminating the need
for the collapsible corporation rules embodied in section 341;99 (2) by
eliminating the need to satisfy the often complex requirements of sections
come tax has been debated for years with no conclusive result. See G. BREAK & J.
PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM:

THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM? 90-104 (1975); R. GOODE,

THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 24-43 (1951); Bird, Why Tax Corporaions in TAXING

9 (Institute for Research on Public Policy 1980); Warren, supra note 87, at
798. Although most public finance economists agree that in an ideal tax system a separate
CORPORATIONS

corporate income tax has no place, see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN

THEORY AND PRACTICE 408 (3d ed. 1980), the United States has since 1909 had a separate
corporate income tax. The separate corporate income tax probably will not be repealed in
the near future. For a summary of the arguments in support of a corporate income tax, see
Bird, supra, at 12-20.
93. See authorities cited supra note 92.
94. See supra note 90.
95. See supra note 91.
96. See FinanceHearing on Reform of Corporate Tax, supra note 87, at 153-57 (statement of John S. Nolan).
97. A study done by the Joint Committee on Taxation and the General Accounting
Office indicates that the portion of the overall United States tax burden borne by corporations declined from 28.3% in 1950 to 11.5% in 1981 and 8.1% in 1982. During that same
period, personal income taxes as a percentage of total federal tax receipts increased from
39.2% in 1950 to 49% in 1982. Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the General
Accounting Office, "Study of the 1982 Effective Tax Rates of Selected Large U.S. Corporations," reproduced in TAX NOTES MICROFICHE DATABASE Doc. No. 83-11145.

98. See authorities cited supra note 92.
99. I.R.C. § 341 (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984; see STAFF REPORT,
supra note 11, at 89.
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336 and 337 and the antiselectivity rules of section 338;100 (3) by limiting
liquidation-reincorporation transactions, thereby simplifying a body of
judically created Subchapter C rules;' 0 ' and (4) by allowing less attention
to be focused on the judicially created tax benefit rule, the clear reflection
of income rule, and the assignment of income rule.102
Would repeal of sections 336 and 337 simplify Subchapter C by eliminating the need for the collapsible corporation provision, section 341? Section 341, which first appeared in 1950 as section 117(m) l0 3 of the 1939
Code, was enacted to curb an abuse made possible by the liquidation nonrecognition rule, which was then embodied in the Regulations. A collapsible corporation is a tax avoidance device that, in its simplest form,
operates in the following manner. A corporation is formed for the purpose
of producing or acquiring an asset, such as a motion picture, which upon
sale or exploitation produces ordinary income. Just before the corporation
begins to realize the ordinary income, the corporation is liquidated, and
the asset is distributed to the shareholder. The nonrecognition rule, now
embodied in section 336(a), protects the corporation from being taxed on
the appreciation in the value of the asset. As to the shareholder, section
331 treats the liquidation as a sale or exchange of the shareholder's stock.
The shareholder, therefore, takes a basis in the asset equal to its fair market value on the date of distribution, 0 4 and the only income tax cost is
long-term capital gain to the shareholder. 0 5 Without section 341, the collapsible corporation device permits transformation of corporate-level ordinary income into long-term capital gain in the shareholder's hands.
Section 341 operates to transform this potential long-term capital gain to
the shareholder into ordinary income.1 °6 Proponents of repeal argue that
repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition rules would eliminate the collapsible corporation device because the corporation would always have to recognize gain when removing assets from corporate solution. Since the
device will not work without the liquidation nonrecognition provisions,
Congress could repeal section 341.
If the inquiry stops at this point, one might conclude that repeal of the
liquidation nonrecognition rules would accomplish a major simplification
of Subchapter C. Section 341 is certainly one of the most complicated
sections of Subchapter C and often serves as a trap for the unwary tax100. ALL

PROPOSALS,

supra note 11, at 111: STAFF

REPORT,

supranote 11, at 34-36, 88-

89.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 37-38, 90-91.
See id at 36.
Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 212, 64 Stat. 906, 934.
I.R.C. § 334(b)(1) (1982).
Id. § 331(a).

106. Section 341 does not cause corporate recognition of gain in this hypothetical, but
only transforms shareholder'sgain into ordinary income. Congress could have elected to tax
the corporation and the shareholder in such a situation, but did not choose to do so. Section
341 does result in corporate recognition if a collapsible corporation sells assets rather than
distributes assets in-kind. See I.R.C. § 337(c)(1)(A) (1982).
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payer. 10 7 Nonetheless, two points should be considered before repeal is
embraced on that basis. First, the Staff Report states that the collapsible
corporation rules could not be repealed for foreign corporations, because
corporate-level gain is generally not taxed on the liquidation of a foreign
corporation. 0 8 Second, an argument can be made that repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition rules would not eliminate the need for section 341,
at least for the sort of protection against abuse that section 341 now provides. 10 9 For example, a person in the business of selling unimproved land
could form a corporation to hold the real estate. The shareholder could,
by waiting for one year and a day, sell the stock of the corporation and
recognize only long-term capital gain on the sale of the stock. The purchaser of the stock, having effective control of the land through control of
the corporation, might well elect to continue to hold the land through the
corporation. The purchaser of the stock could thus defer the corporatelevel tax on the appreciation in value of the land until the corporation
either sold the land or liquidated. The value of such tax deferral is obvious.110 While the Internal Revenue Service might devise a theory on
which to attack this sort of abuse,"' section 341, if it were still in force,
the section extends to sales of stock as
would minimize such abuse because
112
liquidations.
actual
to
as
well
Even if one accepts the argument that repeal of sections 336 and 337
would permit the repeal of section 341 as it applies to all domestic corporations, the repeal of sections 336 and 337 may exchange an existing complex
provision for a new complex provision. Outright repeal of sections 336
and 337, without temporary or permanent relief provisions, would not create new complexity. Such simplifications, however, would result in double
taxation. For that reason, comment 1 3 on the Staff Report suggests mitigation of this double taxation either by temporary relief, 1 4 permanent relief,' Is or both. If temporary or permanent relief is adopted, the provisions
implementing such relief could be very complicated.'1 6 Thus, repeal of the
107. See Ginsburg, Collapsible Corporations-Revisitingan Old Misfortune, 33 TAX L.
REV. 307 (1978).
108. STAFF REPORT, supra note

11, at 89.
109. See Letter from J. Roger Mentz to Roderick A. DeArment, Chief Counsel, Committee on Finance at 3-4 (Oct. 27, 1983), reproduced in TAX NOTES MICROFICHE DATABASE
Doc. No. 83-10848.
110. See W. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 206-10 (2d ed. 1979).
111. The Internal Revenue Service might be able to argue that the seller held the stock of
the corporation primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the seller's business.
The success of such an argument would by no means be assured.
112. I.R.C. § 341(b)(1) (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984.
113. See Finance Hearingon Reform of CorporateTax, supranote 87, at 83 (statement of
Edward N. Delaney); id. at 100 (New York Bar State Association Tax Section); id at 115
(statement of Frank V. Battle, Jr.); id. at 137 (statement of Robert A. Jacobs).
114. Temporary relief might take the form of a phase-in of the tax on capital gains recognized by the corporation as a result of repeal.
115. Permanent relief might take the form of shareholder tax credits based on the corporate level tax, or of exemption of certain assets or transactions from taxation.
116. For a discussion of possible transitional rules and permanent relief rules, see infra
text at notes 166-93.
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liquidation nonrecognition provisions will not necessarily result in overall
simplification of Subchapter C.
Would repeal eliminate the need for the rigid and formal rules of section
336 and 337 and for the complex antiselectivity rules of section 338?
Clearly, repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would, with a
single stroke of the legislative scalpel, remove from the 1954 Code the provisions that create what the ALI Proposals refer to as "substantial continuing problems about what constitutes compliance with the formal and ritual
requirements of sections 336 and 337.'" 17 Repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions, however, may not eliminate the need for the antiselectivity provisions of section 338,118 because Congress's reason for
including the antiselectivity provisions in section 338 is unclear.
Prior to the enactment of the mergers and acquisitions provisions of
TEFRA, 119 a corporation (acquiring corporation) could structure the acquisition of another corporation (target corporation) to obtain a steppedup cost basis in some of the assets of the target corporation while retaining
a carryover basis in the remaining assets of the target corporation. This
selective basis step-up was achieved by using a combination of the preTEFRA partial liquidation rules 120 and the consolidated reporting
rules. 12 1 The assets that were to receive a stepped-up basis would be distributed to the acquiring corporation in a partial liquidation. The target
corporation would recognize no gain because, prior to TEFRA, section 336
applied to partial liquidations as well as to complete liquidations 122 and
the consolidated return provisions permitted deferral of the tax on recapture gains. The acquiring corporation would recognize long-term capital
gain as a result of the partial liquidation distribution, 123 and the assets
would have a basis, in the hands of the acquiring corporation, equal to
their fair market value on the date of distribution. 124 The remaining assets
of the target corporation would retain their historical basis in the hands of
the target corporation. The acquiring corporation would have the additional benefit of using the target corporation's tax attributes by means of
filing consolidated returns. The drafters of the Corporate Takeover Tax
Act of 1982,125 which contained the initial version of the provisions that
Congress ultimately enacted as section 338, believed that the opportunity
presented by the foregoing hypothetical provided an incentive for corporate acquisitions.126 The drafters, however, did not indicate whether they
117. ALl PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 111.
118. The antiselectivity provisions of § 338 are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 338(e) & (f) (1982).
119. TEFRA §§ 222-228.

120. I.R.C. § 336(a) (Supp. V 1981), amended by TEFRA § 222(b); I.R.C. § 346(a)(2)
(Supp. V 1981), amended by TEFRA, § 222(d).
121. I.R.C. §§ 1501-1505, 1551-1552, 1561-1564 (Supp. V. 1981).
122. See supra note 5.
123. I.R.C. § 331(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981), amended by TEFRA, § 222(a).
124. I.R.C. § 334(a) (Supp. V 1981), amended by TEFRA, § 222(e)(1)(C).
125. See supra note 9.
126. See Floor Statement of Rep. Fortney Stark on H.R. 6295, The Corporate Takeover
Tax Act of 1982, at 2, reproduced in TAx NOTES MICROFICHE DATABASE Doc. No. 82-5408.
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perceived the problem as merely the opportunity to select some assets for a
step-up in basis while taking other assets with a carryover basis, or as the
opportunity to obtain a stepped-up basis without recognition of gain by the
distributing corporation.
If the problem that the antiselectivity provisions seek to resolve is the
ability to pick and choose among assets, then repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would not eliminate the problem. Selectivity would
still be possible, albeit at a somewhat greater tax cost to the distributing
corporation than if the liquidation nonrecognition provisions were in
force. If, however, the problem that prompted the enactment of the antiselectivity provisions was the ability to obtain a stepped-up basis without
recognition of gain by the distributing corporation, repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would eliminate the need for the antiselectivity provisions. The antiselectivity provisions may still be needed
though, if repeal is accompanied by enactment of any provisions granting
relief from repeal. For example, if certain assets are exempted from recog27
nition, some sort of antiselectivity provisions would still be required.
Thus, once again, repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions
would not ensure overall simplification of Subchapter C.128
Would repeal limit liquidation-reincorporation transactions? The Staff
Report argues that the General Utilities rule has encouraged liquidationreincorporation transactions because of the opportunity, created by the
rule, to bail out earnings and profits at capital gains rates and to step up
the basis of depreciable assets at the cost of recapture gain to the liquidating corporation and capital gain to the shareholders. 29 The Staff Report
contends that the mixed success of the government in litigating the validity
of such transactions has caused "substantial uncertainty and complexity,
and significant opportunity for abuse."' 30 While repeal of the liquidation
nonrecognition provisions would clearly discourage the use of the liquidation-reincorporation device as a means of obtaining a stepped-up asset basis at relatively small tax cost, the device may continue to be used for
bailing out earnings and profits at capital gain rates. Although repeal of
the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would increase the tax cost of
such bail out, the bail out would still work because the shareholder would
still receive what should have been dividend income, taxable at ordinary
income rates, as long-term capital gain.' 3' If taxpayers continue to use the
liquidation-reincorporation device, the government would, presumably,
continue to litigate the issue, with, presumably, no substantial change in
127. See FinanceHearing on Reform of CorporateTax, supra note 87, at 26 (statement of

Ronald A. Pearlman).
128. Significantly, the Staff Report, referring to the anti-selectivity rules of § 338, provides: "Thus, despite the merits of the restrictions the Congress sought to enact last year, it is
not clear that the statute provides an effective statutory solution; moreover, it is not even
clear that such a solution can be devised." STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 35-36.
129. Id.at 37.
130. Id
131. For a proposed solution to the bail-out problem, see Honabach, Taxing the Corporate Liquidation-A ProposalforConsistency, 8 J. CORP. L. 1, 21-28 (1982).
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the present uncertainty and complexity that concerns the staff.132
Would repeal allow less attention to be focused on the application of the
tax benefit rule, the clear reflection of income rule, and the assignment of
income rule in the context of corporate liquidations? The Staff Report
suggests that repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would
eliminate much of the complexity created by the application of these rules
to liquidations. The theory espoused by the staff is, apparently, that recognition of gain at the corporate level would obviate the need for such
rules.' 3 3 The Staff Report seems, however, to overlook two important
points. First, if certain relief provisions exempt from taxation gain from
certain assets of certain transactions, these rules might still be needed to
ensure a proper tax result. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the
cases cited by the Staff Report on this point all dealt with questions of
timing and of determination of the proper taxpayer, not with the interaction of the three rules with the liquidation nonrecognition provisions. 34
All three rules would continue to apply to corporate liquidation even after
repeal of sections 336 and 337.135 The tax benefit rule would continue to
apply because, as the Supreme Court held in Hillsboro National Bank v.
Commissioner,136 the tax benefit rule applies whenever "events occur that
are fundamentally inconsistent with an earlier deduction."'' 37 The clear
reflection of income and assignment of income rules would continue to
apply because these rules address questions of whether the liquidating corporation or the shareholders should be charged with receipt of certain income. The issue is not recognition, but rather identification of the proper
taxpayer. Repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions, therefore,
should not greatly decrease the use of these three rules in the context of
corporate liquidations.
3. Tax Neutrality
A criterion of sound tax policy is that the tax law should reduce to the
minimum the intrusion of the tax into household and business decisions
concerning the amount of income to earn, the way to earn income, and
how to use income and wealth. 38 The assumption is that in a free market
economy without income tax, private economic decisions would direct resources into their most profitable uses. Of course, no system of taxation
132. One commentator has argued that the Staff Report greatly overstates the problem of
the liquidation-reincorporation problem. Finance Hearing on Reform of Corporate Tax,
supra note 87, at 165 (statement of John S. Nolan).
133. See STAFF REPORT, supra note I1,at 36.
134. Id
135. Committee on Taxation, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comments with Respect to the Staff Report at 21-22 (Nov. 2, 1983), reproducedin TAX NOTES
MICROFICHE DATABASE Doc. No. 83-11125.
136. 103 S. Ct. 1134, 75 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1983).
137. Id.at 1138, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 139.
138. Ture, FederalIncome Tax Rates, Incentives, and Equities, in ESSAYS ON TAXATION

24 (1974).
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will ever attain complete neutrality. 39 Our system of income taxation
presents many examples of provisions that are intended to encourage 40 or
discourage' 4' specific decisions concerning the earning and use of income.
Indeed, our income tax law clearly operates as a major instrument of social
and economic policy. '42 Notwithstanding the fact that any income tax system, including our own, will affect economic decisions to some degree, a
neutral tax system should affect economic decisions to the least extent
possible.
Application of the criterion of tax neutrality to Subchapter C is difficult
because the present separate corporate income tax influences decisions to
use the corporate vehicle for conducting a business enterprise. This influence is particularly strong for corporations that are not eligible to avoid
imposition of the corporate level tax by utilizing the provisions of Subchapter S. 43 As noted earlier, however, our system has been, in practice if
not in theory, a compromise involving double taxation of earnings from
normal business operations and single taxation at the shareholder level of
extraordinary events such as liquidations. Whatever effect the existence of
the present separate corporate income tax has on decisions to do business
in corporate form, the principle of tax neutrality cannot be discarded when
considering reform of Subchapter C. An examination of any reform proposals is necessary to determine whether such proposals would reduce the
intrusion of the corporate income tax law into decisions affecting business
operations. 144
Proponents of repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions argue
that the existence of these provisions makes Subchapter C less tax-neutral
than it would be without those provisions. The Staff Report, however,
recognizes that the neutrality problem arises not solely because of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions, but rather because of the combination
of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions and the liquidation basis provisions. t4S The Staff Report contends that the ability to combine these
provisions, thereby obtaining a stepped-up basis in corporate assets without incurring any corresponding tax on the appreciated value of the assets,
is enough of an incentive for mergers that otherwise would not have oc139. "[N]o income tax can be completely neutral since it increases the price of income
generating activities relative to leisure." Id. at 25.
140. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 38 (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984 (Investment
Tax Credit); I.R.C. § 168 (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984 (Accelerated Cost
Recovery); I.R.C. § 170 (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984 (Charitable Contributions Deduction); I.R.C. § 1202 (1982) (Deduction for Capital Gains).
141. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 531-37 (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984 (Improper
Accumulations); I.R.C. §§ 541-547 (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984 (Personal
Holding Companies).
142. See J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (3d ed. 1977).
143. Subchapter S of the 1954 Code is comprised of §§ 1361-1379.
144. The key word in this context is "reduce," because complete neutrality would be
neither possible nor desirable. For example, in order to prevent abuse of the corporate form
to gain improper tax benefits, the tax law would have to include provisions such as I.R.C.
§ 269A (1982) (personal service corporations formed or availed of to avoid or evade income
tax), that would discourage the use of the corporate form under certain circumstances.
145. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 89-90.
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curred. 146 Although some commentators have disagreed with the staff's
conclusion that the liquidation nonrecognition provisions cause mergers, 147 arguably, the Staff Report does identify a key tax neutrality
problem.
The ALI Proposals also discuss the tax neutrality issue in connection
with the proposed repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions.
The ALI Proposals note two instances of lack of tax neutrality. First, the
liquidation nonrecognition provisions create "too large a discrepancy in
favor of selling out or distribution as compared with continuation in business."' 14 8 The discrepancy exists not just because of the lack of a corporate
level tax imposed upon liquidation, but because the shareholders in a section 336 liquidation or the purchasers in a section 337 liquidation get a
stepped-up basis in the corporate assets without the imposition of any corresponding tax on the appreciation in value of those assets. Second, the
liquidation nonrecognition provisions are "out of harmony with the treatment of an unincorporated proprietor"' 149 because a liquidating corporation recognizes gain on the bulk sale or distribution of inventory only to
the extent of recapture of the LIFO benefit,150 whereas an unincorporated
proprietor must recognize all gain generated by the bulk sale of inventory.
Similarly, while the unincorporated cash basis proprietor must recognize
ordinary income on amounts allocated to accounts receivable, the cash basis corporation that liquidates is ordinarily not required to recognize income on sale or distribution of its accounts receivable. Although the ALI
Proposals do identify two neutrality problems, unfortunately the discussion of these problems focuses on the failure to impose a tax on the distributing corporation, rather than on the problem of the opportunity, under
present law, to obtain a stepped-up asset basis without payment of any
corresponding tax.
The tax neutrality problems raised in the Staff Report and in the ALI
Proposals are valid problems. Nevertheless, complete repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions is not necessarily the best way of dealing
with these problems, even though complete repeal is certainly the simplest
response to the problem of the unjustified increase in asset basis. That
latter problem is avoidable, however, by retaining the liquidation nonrecognition provisions, but requiring the distributees to take a carryover basis
in the corporate assets. Such an approach prevents a step-up in basis without a tax on the appreciation in the value of the assets, but also shifts the
tax from the liquidating corporation to the distributees and defers the tax
until the distributees dispose of the property in a taxable transaction. Such
shifting and deferral would not be appropriate in all situations. A repeal
146. Id
147. Finance Hearingon Reform of CorporateTax, supra note 87, at 164. For a general
FELD & D. TER-

discussion of this issue prepared before the Staff Report was issued, see A.
KLA, TAX POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION
148. ALl PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 112.

149. Id.at 114.

150. I.R.C. §§ 337(b)(2), 337(f) (1982).

66 (1980).
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of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would prevent shifting and
deferral, but would create hardships in certain circumstances. An appropriate response to the tax neutrality problems must take into account the
fact that corporations liquidate for different reasons. Most liquidations involve closely held corporations, rather than publicly held corporations,
and are undertaken because: (1) the owners wish to continue the business
in unincorporated form; (2) the owners wish to sell the business; or (3) the
owners wish to terminate the business. The appropriate tax treatment of
liquidations motivated by each of these reasons must be considered
separately.
Liquidations that reflect the decision of the owners to continue a business in unincorporated form present no compelling reason to require recognition of gain or loss by the liquidating corporation. The Staff Report
contemplates repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions, but that
section 351 would be left in place. The rationale for the nonrecognition of
gain or loss upon incorporation is that a mere change in the form of a
business operation or, in the case of a new business, the initial choice of
operating form is not an appropriate taxable event. If incorporation were
a taxable event, taxpayers might not elect to incorporate their businesses.
The rationale behind section 351 is consistent with the principle of tax
neutrality that tax law should affect economic decisions as little as possible.
The same rationale applies when the decision is made to switch from incorporated to unincorporated form. In general, the federal income tax
should not hinder either the decision to incorporate or the decision to continue a business in unincorporated form.
If the owners of a corporate business wish to continue the business in
noncorporate form, Congress can prevent the problem of the stepped-up
asset basis without any corresponding tax by requiring the shareholders to
take a carryover basis in the distributed assets. The corporation might be
allowed to elect gain recognition upon distribution of its assets, in which
case the shareholders would take a basis in the assets equal to their fair
market value on the date of distribution. Permitting the corporation to
treat the liquidation as a nonrecognition event' 5' would shift the tax on the
appreciation in value of the assets to the shareholders and would permit
deferral of the tax until the shareholders subsequently disposed of the assets in a taxable transaction. While the opportunity to shift and defer tax
liability could result in some taxpayer abuse, as section 351 now recognizes, shifting and deferral are appropriate because immediate taxation
improperly affects decisions relating to the form in which a business is
conducted.
In contrast, liquidations that reflect the decision of the owners to sell the
corporate business by selling its assets should be taxable events. The sale
of the assets presents an appropriate time to require recognition of gain or
151. The election to treat the liquidation as a nonrecognition event would be subject to
all recapture requirements, both statutory and judicial, that currently apply to liquidations
under § 336.
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loss by the liquidating corporation. The present rule of corporate nonrecognition is inconsistent with the tax treatment of individuals and partnerships, for whom asset sales are taxable events. Further, the liquidation
nonrecognition provisions create distortions in the allocation of the
purchase price paid for corporate assets. For example, because a liquidating corporation does not recognize gain when it sells its inventory in bulk
as a part of section 337 liquidation, such a sale may cause an excessive
allocation of purchase price to inventory. 5 2 Section 337(0, which is effective for plans of liquidation adopted after December 31, 1982,153 responds
to this problem to an extent by requiring that the liquidating corporation
recapture any tax benefit that it realized from using the LIFO inventory
method. 154 Section 337(0 does not, however, wholly resolve the problem
because unrecaptured inventory gain is still protected by the nonrecognition provisions. Since the purchaser receives a cost basis in the inventory,
a significant portion of what should have been taxed as ordinary income
55
will in effect escape taxation entirely.
Making this type of liquidation a taxable event could cause some taxpayers to avoid asset sale liquidations by resorting to mergers that would
satisfy the requirements of the Code's taxfree reorganization provisions.
Eliminating tax-motivated mergers is a stated goal of the Staff Report,' 56
yet repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions could actually increase certain types of merger activity. For that reason, some commentators have argued that repeal would violate the principle of tax
neutrality. 157 They point out that if a corporate business is disposed of by
tax-free reorganization, the shareholders of the acquired corporation must
maintain an investment in the acquiring corporation. Thus, by engaging
in tax-free reorganization in order to avoid corporate-level taxation, the
shareholders are not free to reinvest the proceeds of the "sale" in a new
venture. This intrusion of the tax system into economic decision-making
must, however, be weighed against the fact that the tax-free reorganization
provisions do not permit a stepped-up asset basis until gain is recognized.
Depending upon the type of tax-free reorganization used, the acquired
corporation may shift the tax to the acquiring corporation. Although the
reorganization nonrecognition rules permit the acquiring corporation to
defer recognition of the tax, the gain ultimately will be taxed. For that
reason, repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions for liquidations
152. ALl PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 112-13.

153. Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-362, § 101, 96 Stat. 1726.
154. I.R.C. § 337(0 (1982) requires recapture of the "LIFO Recapture Amount." The
term "LIFO Recapture Amount" is defined in I.R.C. §.336(b)(3) (1982) as the amount, if
any, by which the value of inventory assets determined under the first-in, first-out method
exceeds the value of those assets determined under the last-in, first-out method.
155. Although the shareholders of a liquidating corporation recognize gain upon receipt
of the liquidating distribution, that gain, as the ALl Proposals point out, is long-term capital
gain. The relationship of that gain to the untaxed inventory gain and other untaxed corporate level gain is purely fortuitous. ALI PROPOSALS, supra note I1, at 112.
156. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 89.
157. See FinanceHearing on Reform of CorporateTax, supra note 87, at 151.
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that reflect a decision to sell the corporate business would not create a
serious tax neutrality problem.
Liquidations that reflect the decision of the owners to terminate the corporate business without selling the assets to a third party present a difficult
problem in terms of tax neutrality. The continuity of business ownership,
which would justify nonrecognition when the business is continued by the
owners after the corporate form is abandoned, does not exist when the
business is terminated. On the other hand, the assets have not been sold,
so that hardship may result if a corporate-level tax is imposed. Such hardship might cause continuation of a business that the owners otherwise
would terminate. One approach to this type of liquidation allows a corporate election. The corporation could either treat the liquidation as a taxable event, with the result that the shareholders would take a stepped-up
basis in the assets, or as a nonrecognition
event, in which case the share58
holders would take a carryover basis.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the liquidation nonrecognition
provisions, in combination with the liquidation basis provisions, create tax
neutrality problems. If these problems are addressed by repealing the liquidation nonrecognition provisions, a new tax neutrality problem may
arise. To the extent that gain on corporate assets is the result of inflation, a
liquidation decision must include consideration of the amount of the
double tax on such gain. Even if such assets generate long-term capital
gain, double taxation of inflation-created capital gain would, under the
present rate structure, produce a harsh result. For example, Corporation
C, which has a capital asset with a fair market value of $20,000 and a basis
to C of $10,000, adopts a plan of liquidation that calls for the sale of the
asset to a third party and the distribution of the proceeds of the sale to C's
sole stockholder, S. If section 337 is repealed, C would have to pay a tax
on the $10,000 long-term capital gain of $2,800.'59 Cwould then distribute
the net proceeds, $7,200, to S. If S is in the 50% tax bracket, S will pay a
tax of $1,440 on the distribution. 160 The total income tax imposed on the
$10,000 of long-term capital gain would be $4,240, which results in an effective tax rate of 42.4%. To the extent that this tax rate is applied to inflation-created gain, the amount of tax might militate against liquidation.
Such a problem would be particularly acute for closely held family corporations that have been in existence for many years.
A related problem that repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions could cause involves the taxation of preincorporation gains. Section
351 provides that, as a general rule, accrued appreciation will not be recognized when property is transferred to a newly formed corporation. The
transfer, therefore, may include substantial preincorporation gain, much of
158. Some provisions would be necessary to prevent abuse in the form of a purported
termination liquidation followed by a prearranged sale of assets.
159. This tax is based on the corporate capital gains rate of 28%. I.R.C. § 1201(a) (1982).
160. The $7,200 would be long-term capital gain to the shareholder. Applying the
§ 1202(a) net capital gain deduction of 60%, $2,880 (40%) of the $7,200 distributed is subject
to tax at the 50% marginal rate. The resulting tax would be $1,440.
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which might be inflation-created. Although the constitution does not bar
taxing the corporation on preincorporation gain,' 6' the resulting double
tax could be imposed largely on inflation-created gain. If a corporation
that is not liquidating sells an asset that has substantial preincorporation
gain, the corporation must recognize all of the gain, but the corporation
can avoid double taxation by not distributing the proceeds of the sale. The
liquidating corporation has no such option.
Many factors enter into the decision to liquidate. The extent to which
the double tax on inflation-created gain would affect the decision to liquidate is not clear. In addition, the problem of the appropriate response of
our income tax system to inflation-created gain extends beyond the area of
corporate liquidations. Nonetheless, if the imposition of a double tax on
such gain might lock some existing corporate businesses in corporate form,
or if the prospect of a double tax on such gain might deter businesses from
incorporating, Congress should take those possibilities into account as it
considers the liquidation nonrecognition provisions.
To this point, the discussion has centered on the issue of tax neutrality in
terms of recognition of gain by the liquidating corporation. Complete repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would, however, also
permit the liquidating corporation to recognize accrued losses. Existing
law both denies the liquidating corporation the opportunity to use such
losses and, by requiring the shareholder to take as a basis the distributed
assets' fair market value on the date of distribution, effectively prevents the
shareholder from using the losses. Complete repeal would resolve this
problem by allowing the liquidating corporation to utilize the losses to offset its income. A problem might arise if the liquidating corporation could
elect to treat an in-kind liquidation as a nontaxable event and if the shareholder were required to take a carryover basis in the distributed assets. In
such a situation, the liquidating corporation could shift losses that it might
not be able to use to its shareholders. A response to this problem is suggested by section 1015, which provides for a carryover basis to a donee
subject to the rule that, for purposes of computing loss, the donee must use
as his basis in the asset the lesser of either the fair market value on the date
of the gift or the donor's basis. If the liquidating corporation elected to
treat the liquidation as a nontaxable event, the shareholder could be required to take a carryover basis. For purposes of computing loss on a
subsequent disposition of the assets, the shareholder could be required to
use the lesser of either the carryover basis or the fair market value on the
date of distribution. This approach would discourage liquidations motivated by a desire to shift losses from a corporation to its shareholders.
In summary, the tax neutrality problems associated with the liquidation
nonrecognition provisions are not created by those provisions alone. To
address the tax neutrality problems by completely repealing the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would resolve some tax neutrality problems
161. See Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 482 (1929) (no constitutional impediment to taxing donee on appreciation in value of property while in hands of donor).
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while creating others. For existing corporations, complete repeal would
impose an added tax cost on the decision to liquidate, without regard to
the purpose for the liquidation. Complete repeal would not distinguish
between liquidations that reflect a mere change in the form in which a
business is conducted and liquidations that mark the sale or termination of
a business. As a result, repeal would create a general bias against liquidations. Although such a bias would have the salutory effect of eliminating
the existing discrepancy in favor of selling out rather than continuing a
business, such a bias could also cause new problems. For example, this
bias might force businesses, which once operated efficiently in corporate
form but now might be more efficiently operated in noncorporate form, to
remain in corporate form. For new businesses and existing businesses considering incorporation, repeal would provide an incentive to avoid incorporation because of the increased tax cost of doing business in corporate
form. 162 Such a result would be unfortunate because tax laws should not
affect decisions to take advantage of the special nontax protections of doing business in corporate form.
4. Broadening the Tax Base
Proponents of repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions argue
that repeal will broaden the tax base, thereby benefitting all taxpayers by
lowering tax rates.' 63 Several points need to be considered in evaluating
this argument. First, implicit in a proposal to broaden the tax base is the
expectation that such action would increase tax revenues. Repeal of the
liquidation nonrecognition provisions might not result in increased revenues because, faced with the prospect of double taxation, corporations
might either refrain from liquidating or engage in tax-free reorganizations.
Either result would generate no additional tax revenue. 64 Second, even if
the base broadening produces additional revenue, a reduction in tax rates
in the near future is not ensured. At a time when the federal budget deficit
is at its greatest amount ever in this country's history, broadening of the
corporate tax base is unlikely to result in immediate lowering of tax rates.
Base broadening is a commendable goal, but the base broadening that
would result from repealing the liquidation nonrecognition provisions
should not be advanced as a means of immediately reducing the income
tax rates.
5. Mitigation
Repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would result in a
profound change in the operation of our system of corporate income taxation. Congress, therefore, must consider possible temporary or permanent
162. Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study. Acquisitions and Distributions, 33 TAx LAw. 743, 771 (1980).
163. See Ginsberg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, 38 TAx L. REV. 171, 319 (1983);
STAFF REPORT, supra note I I, at 89.
164. See Warren, supra note 87, at 719.
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relief provisions that would mitigate the effects of repeal. Repeal legislation certainly must include provisions for transactions in progress at the
time of repeal. Presumably drafting of such provisions would not pose an
insurmountable problem. 165 This Article, therefore, focuses on other temporary or permanent relief provisions that Congress might consider if it
elects to repeal the liquidation nonrecognition provisions.
As discussed earlier, the primary impact of repeal would be on closely
held corporations. To address that problem, the American Bar Association Section of Taxation has suggested the establishment of a special exception from the corporate level tax for closely held corporations.1 66 The"
ABA Statement suggests defining the term "closely held corporation" as
that term is presently defined in the personal holding company provisions
of the 1954 Code.' 6 7 The ABA Statement further suggests that the definition should establish a "relatively low maximum asset level" as one criterion for closely held corporation status.' 68 The ABA Statement does not
elaborate on what would be considered a relatively low asset level. Apparently, however, the ABA Statement is premised on the assumption that
only very small corporations, which conduct businesses that could be conducted as sole proprietorships or as partnerships, should receive relief from
repeal.' 69 Such corporations seldom pay dividends, because they usually
can distribute their earnings and profits in the form of salaries that are
deductible by the corporations in computing taxable income. By paying
salaries, the corporations avoid any double taxation under current law.
Thus, the ABA Statement may be endorsing protection of the status quo.
Apart from the fact that the close corporation exception suggested by the
ABA Statement does not clearly establish the scope of the exception, the
suggestion merits careful scrutiny on two points. First, most if not all of
the corporations apparently protected by the exception would also qualify
to elect taxation under Subchapter S. Election of Subchapter S would
eliminate the problem of double taxation.170 If sections 336 and 337 were
repealed, on liquidation the recognition of gain at the corporate level
would increase the gain passed through to the shareholders, but if the approach established by section 1363(d) for nonliquidating distributions of
appreciated property is followed, the only tax imposed would be at the
shareholder level.' 7 1 The close corporation exception would benefit those
corporations that could not or did not wish to elect Subchapter S treat165. But see Pierson, Lawmaking, 18 TAx NOTEs 659 (Feb. 21,

1983) (discussing

problems of drafting and adopting TEFRA).
166. See Finance Hearingon Reform of CorporateTax, supra note 87, at 90 (statement of
Edward N. Delaney, Chairman, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association).
167. See I.R.C. § 542(a)(2) (1982).
168. Finance Hearing on Reform of CorporateTax, supra note 87, at 90.
169. See id.at 91.
170. Of course, I.R.C. § 1374 (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, could impose a corporate level tax on excess capital gains, and I.R.C. § 1375, as amended by Tax
Reform Act of 1984, could impose a corporate level tax on excess passive investment
income.
171. See I.R.C. § 331 (1982).
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ment. Some corporations falling within the exception suggested in the
ABA Statement would not qualify for Subchapter S treatment because
they would have, for estate planning purposes, nonqualified trusts as
shareholders.' 72 Some corporations might not want to elect Subchapter S
treatment because the election would eliminate the possibility of accumulating earnings and profits at the corporate level without exposing them to
tax at the shareholder level. Nonetheless, Subchapter S provides many
small corporations with an existing means of eliminating the double tax
burden caused by repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions.
Thus, the exception suggested by the ABA Statement would benefit only a
very small group of corporations while, as noted below, creating new complexity in Subchapter C.
A second problem raised by the exception suggested by the ABA Statement is that it would create additional complexity in Subchapter C. In the
context of Subchapter C, complexity by itself is not automatically a valid
objection to a provision. The suggested exception would, however, not
only add complexity, 173 but would also create an opportunity for manipulation. As the ABA Statement points out, such an exception would require
an anti-avoidance rule to deal with fragmentation of assets in multiple
commonly controlled corporations. 174 In light of the complexity and potential for manipulation, an exception for closely held corporations seems
inappropriate.
If we assume that an attempt to except close corporations from the effects of repeal is inappropriate, exempting either certain transactions or
certain assets from the effects of repeal might be possible. A possible candidate for a transactional exception would be a complete liquidation done
for the purpose of shifting from incorporated to unincorporated form. As
discussed earlier, if the rationale for nonrecognition at the time of incorporation is correct, the same rationale should apply to a liquidation done
solely for the purpose of continuing the same business with the same assets
in unincorporated form. If such an exception were created, the price for
corporate nonrecognition upon liquidation, like the price for nonrecognition upon incorporation, should be that the shareholders would take a
carryover basis in the distributed assets. The carryover basis would be
necessary to avoid the collapsible corporation problem. 75
The exception for in-kind liquidations, which are part of a mere change
in the form in which a business is conducted, presents significant problems,
despite its attractiveness. First, although recapture generally does not occur upon incorporation, 76 recapture should apply upon liquidation. Since
172. See id § 1361(c)(2), (d) (1982), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984 (descriptions
of qualified trusts).
173. See Finance Hearing on Reform of Corporate Tax, supra note 87, at 90 n.4 (ABA
statement).
174. Id.
175. ALl PROPOSALS, supra note 1I, at 114-15.
176. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(3), 1250(d)(3) (1982) (exempting tax-free contributions upon
incorporation from recapture rules).
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the corporation benefitted from the depreciation deductions, the corporation should bear the burden of recapture upon liquidation. To the extent
that the corporation took advantage of more depreciation than was justified by the actual economic condition of its assets, recapture is appropriate.
Similarly, the tax benefit rule and the assignment of income rules should
apply notwithstanding such an exception. Second, if such liquidations are
exempted from recognition, provisions would have to be implemented to
prevent shareholders from immediately engaging in prearranged asset
sales following in-kind liquidations. This abuse would revive the
problems illustrated by the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Commission v. Court Holding Co. 177 and United States v. CumberlandPublic Service Co.178 Making corporate nonrecognition contingent on continuation of the former corporate business for a substantial period of time,
perhaps one year, affords a possible solution to this problem. Such a solution would introduce an element of complexity, but the 1954 Code con179
tains precedent for this type of approach.
Instead of creating an exception for in-kind liquidations, Congress
might consider creating exceptions for certainassets distributed by a liquidating corporation. One possibility involves excepting gain on assets held
for an extended period of time from recognition at the corporate level.
The rationale for such an exception would be that the gain on such assets
is largely attributable to inflation and should not be subjected to double
taxation even at favorable capital gains rates.' 8 0 Proponents of such an
exception emphasize this rationale.' 8 1 The Staff Report, on the other
hand, rejects such an exception precisely because the exception avoids
182
double taxation.
The adoption of such an exception would raise questions regarding the
type of assets to cover and their related holding periods. As to the former
question, capital assets and section 1231 assets seem to be the appropriate
candidates for coverage. 83 The exception should not cover assets, such as
inventory, that produce ordinary income, even though they are subject to
inflation. Such assets generally turn over regularly enough to avoid the
problems of serious inflation-created gains. As to the latter question, one
proponent of the exception has suggested a period of between three to five
177. 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (immediate sale by shareholders of a property in a liquidating
dividend deemed essentially a sale by corporation).
178. 338 U.S. 451 (1950) (court not required to find that shareholder's immediate sale of
assets gained in liquidating distribution constituted a sale by distributing corporation).
179. See I.R.C. § 302(c) (1982) (granting complete redemption treatment upon conditions set forth therein).
180. See Finance Hearing on Reform of CorporateTax, supra note 87, at 148-49 (statement of John S. Nolan).
181. See id at 118 (statement of Frank V. Battle, Jr., Chairman, Special Committee on
Subchapter C Legislation, Chicago Bar Association); id at 142 (statement of Robert A.
Jacobs).
182. STAFF REPORT, upra note 11, at 93.
183. See Finance Hearingon Reform of Corporate Tax, supra note 87, at 273-76 (statement of James M. Roche); id. at 142 (statement of Robert A. Jacobs).
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years as an appropriate holding period.' 8 4 The reason for this suggestion
is not clear. Although the long-term capital gain holding period is presently one year, 8 5 proponents apparently believe that a longer period is
required to justify the exception to the liquidation recognition rules. The
longer period would help to ensure that the gain being protected is in fact
inflation-created. On the other hand, any holding period is selected on an
essentially arbitrary basis and would not reflect changes in the rate of inflation. For that reason, an exception for assets held for a long period of
time is not very attractive.
One point that proponents of such an exception have not addressed is
the method of calculating a holding period. For example, should a corporation be permitted to tack the holding period of a transferor of the property who transferred the property to the corporation under section 351?
For purposes of determining gain or loss on the disposition of such an
asset, a corporation is presently permitted to tack the holding period of the
transferor.' 8 6 If the purpose of the exception is to minimize the effects of
the double tax on inflation-created gain, tacking would seem appropriate.
Tacking would permit manipulation, however, if on liquidation the shareholder received a stepped-up basis in the asset. In such a situation, a
shareholder could transfer a long-held, low-basis asset to a controlled corporation, then liquidate the corporation and get the asset back with a
stepped-up basis without the imposition of any corporate income tax.
That problem could, however, be avoided by requiring that such assets
take a carryover basis in the hands of the shareholder.
This Article has to this point examined proposals that would mitigate
the effects of repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions by excepting certain transactions or assets from recognition. A conceptually different approach to mitigation of the effects of repeal would be to repeal the
liquidation nonrecognition provisions entirely, but provide temporary or
permanent relief from the double taxation created by repeal. As a possible
approach to mitigation, the Staff Report suggested phasing in the corporate capital gains tax.' 87 As proposed by the Staff Report, the phase-in
would be accomplished over a twelve-year period, beginning at 4%, increasing to 8% the next year, and then increasing at the rate of 2% per year
until the current corporate capital gains rate of 28% is reached.18 8 The
phase-in proposed by the Staff Report would apply only to corporate longterm capital gains, including section 1231 gains treated as long-term capital gains. Thus, no relief would be available for ordinary income recognized by the corporation. Since the phase-in would eventually impose the
present 28% corporate tax on capital gains, the phase-in would merely
184. See id at 142 (statement of Robert A. Jacobs).
185. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (1982). But see Tax Reform Act of 1984, § 1001, 98 Stat. 494, 1011
(reducing holding period for long-term capital gain to six months for property acquired after
June 22, 1984, and before Jan. 1, 1988).
186. I.R.C. § 1223(2) (1982).
187. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 65-66, 94.
188. Id at 66.
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postpone, and not eliminate, the problem of double taxation of such gains.
In view of the fact that the double tax would result in a maximum total tax
on long-term capital gains of 42.4%, and considering the fact that a large
portion of such gain may be inflation-created, the phase-in proposed in the
Staff Report does not appear to be a proper response to the problem.
The development of a shareholder tax credit based on the corporate
level tax paid on liquidating gain would provide a permanent solution to
the double tax problem. Theoretically, Congress could base the shareholder credit on the corporate-level tax imposed on all of the corporation's
liquidating gain. The ALI Proposals, however, suggest a shareholder
credit based only on the corporate capital gain tax paid as a result of liquidation. 89 The ALI suggestion apparently reflects the determination that
the double tax on liquidation is inappropriate only as to gains on long-held
assets. The Staff Report rejects any shareholder tax credit proposal as too
complicated,1 90 a view shared by many practitioners.' 9 1
The argument favoring rejection of the shareholder credit because it is
too complex deserves examination. Although, in the context of Subchapter C, complexity alone is not necessarily a valid reason for avoiding
an approach to a particular problem, the shareholder tax credit would be
complex. Much of the complexity in drafting and administering a share192
holder tax credit arises in the context of nonliquidating distributions,
but the credit would present some problems in the context of liquidating
distributions as well. For example, rules would have to be drafted to deal
with allocation of the credit to holders of preferred stock and convertible
debt, and the shareholder credit could create inequities. The shareholder
credit should not be permitted to exceed the shareholder's recognized gain
on the liquidation. For that reason, a shareholder who has a high basis in
his or her stock would realize a relatively small gain on liquidation and
might be unable to utilize the credit fully, while a shareholder with a low
basis in his or her stock would be able to take full advantage of the credit.
In addition, if a shareholder is a tax-exempt entity, the credit would be
worthless to the shareholder. Should such a shareholder nonetheless be
allocated a share of the credit, and, if so, should such share be refundable
so that the shareholder can use the credit? If the purpose of the shareholder credit is to avoid double taxation, the tax-exempt shareholder
should be allocated a portion of the tax credit so that each shareholder will
receive a portion equal to the amount of stock owned, but that credit
should not be refundable. The shareholder tax credit should not be used
to create a tax benefit for a shareholder not affected by double taxation.
A shareholder tax credit raises several additional questions. First,
should the shareholder credit be based on any income recognized by the
189. ALI PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 134-41 (Proposal C 3).
190. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 93.

191. See Finance Hearingon Reform of CorporateTax, supranote 85, at 90 (statement of
Edward N. Delaney); id. at 169 (statement of John S. Nolan); id at 276-78 (statement of
James M. Roche).
192. See id at 276-78 (statement of James M. Roche).
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liquidating corporation under any statutory recapture provisions, the tax
benefit rule, or the assignment of income rules? If the recapture provisions
are to be effective in dealing with excess depreciation taken by a corporation, the effect of the recapture should not be diluted by use of a shareholder credit based on recapture income. Similarly, if the tax benefit rule
and the assignment of income rules are to be effective, the shareholder tax
credit should not be based on income recognized under these rules.
Second, should the shareholder credit be based on the corporate-level
tax on ordinary income, other than recapture income, recognized by the
liquidating corporation? Basing the shareholder credit on such ordinary
income potentially raises the collapsible corporation problem. While the
corporation would be taxed on the ordinary income, the impact of the corporate-level tax would be reduced or eliminated by giving shareholders a
credit based on ordinary income against the shareholder's capital gain. If
a principal concern is that repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would impose a confiscatory rate of tax on gain created largely by
inflation, the shareholder credit should limit relief to the corporate-level
tax on such gain. Finally, permitting a shareholder credit based on the
corporate-level tax on ordinary income would continue the existing disharmony between the tax treatment of an unincorporated proprietor's bulk
sale of inventory and a corporation's liquidating bulk sale of inventory.
Third, should the shareholder credit be limited to a credit based on the
corporate-level tax on long-held capital assets and section 1231 assets? As
discussed earlier, if the concern is the excessive tax on inflation-created
gains, merely limiting the shareholder credit to the corporate-level tax paid
on long-term capital gain generated by the sale or distribution of capital
assets and section 1231 assets may provide more protection than is required. Perhaps an appropriate solution would base the credit on the corporate-level tax paid on gain from long-held capital assets and section
1231 assets, since those assets would most likely carry inflation-created
gain. Such an approach would, of course, involve the difficult question of
defining the term "long-held."
A final point that requires review as part of an examination of possible
action to mitigate the effects of repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition
provisions is the proper treatment of the goodwill of a liquidating corporation. Although the Staff Report deals with goodwill in the context of corporate acquisitions, 93 it does not deal explicitly with goodwill in the
context of corporate liquidations. The Staff Report generally treats corporate liquidations in the same way as corporate acquisitions are treated. If a
corporation liquidates by selling its assets and distributing the proceeds of
the sale, then presumably the Staff Report approach produces the result
that, as in cost basis acquisition, 94 any unallocated acquisition premium
attributable to goodwill would not be taxed at the corporate level. Presumably for the same reason, goodwill takes a carryover basis in the hands
193. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 58, 61.
194. Id. at 60.
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of the purchaser. The manner in which the Staff would deal with goodwill
in the context of an in-kind liquidation, however, is not clear. Arguably,
the proper result depends on whether the liquidation marked the termination of a business or the continuation of business in unincorporated form.
If the business simply terminated, any goodwill associated with the business would be extinguished. If, however, the business were continued in
unincorporated form, the goodwill would also continue. In such a situation the goodwill should not be taxed at the corporate level, but should
take a carryover basis in the hands of the shareholders.
6. A Possible Compromise
No solution to the problems discussed in this Article will satisfy everyone. As the foregoing discussion indicates, the present liquidation nonrecognition provisions were not the product of careful analysis and they do
produce significant problems. All of the proposed changes, however, raise
significant problems of their own. For the reasons thoroughly discussed in
Professor Alvin Warren's excellent article, 95 the best solution to the
problems raised by the liquidation nonrecognition provisions is integration
of the corporate and individual income taxes. Since Congress will not
likely embrace integration, the corporate income tax will assumedly continue to exist as a separate tax, so any tax reform should be structured
accordingly. If that assumption is correct, Congress must ask whether the
liquidation nonrecognition provisions present a problem of sufficient magnitude to require some sort of change.
Arguably, some change is needed. The liquidation nonrecognition provisions, together with the liquidation basis provisions, do create an incentive for liquidation. That incentive exists because a taxpayer presently can
utilize a liquidation to obtain a stepped-up basis in corporate assets at the
cost of recognition of long-term capital gain at the shareholder level. Since
this incentive is the real problem created by the liquidation nonrecognition
provisions, complete repeal of these provisions is far too drastic a means of
resolving the problem. The following approach seeks to eliminate the incentive, while recognizing that liquidations are undertaken for one of three
reasons.
The existing liquidation nonrecognition provisions would be repealed
and replaced by provisions that would carry out the following treatment of
liquidations. Corporate asset sales that currently are covered by section
337, would, with the exception of sales of goodwill, be taxable events for
the selling corporation. Purchasers of the corporate assets would take a
cost basis in all assets except for goodwill, in which they would take a
carryover basis. The shareholders of the liquidated corporation would be
allowed a nonrefundable credit based on the amount of corporate capital
gains tax paid. Liquidations involving in-kind distributions to shareholders would be subject to a corporate election. The liquidating corporation
195. Warren, supra note 87.
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could elect to have the liquidation treated either as a taxable event for the
corporation, or as a nonrecognition event, except to the extent of recapture
of depreciation, recapturable tax credits, and recognition required by the
tax benefit or the assignment of income rules. If the liquidation is treated
as a taxable event for the corporation, shareholders would recognize gain
under sections 331 or 1001, taking the corporate assets with a basis equal to
the fair market value of the assets on the date of distribution and utilizing
the nonrefundable tax credit mentioned above. If the liquidating corporation elects to avoid taxation at the corporate level, except for recapture
gain, the corporate assets would be distributed to the shareholders with a
carryover basis. Shifting of losses would be prevented by requiring the
shareholders to compute loss based on the lesser of either the fair market
value of the assets on the date of the liquidating distribution or the carryover basis. No tax credit would be allowed to the shareholders because no
double taxation of corporate capital gain would be involved.
The approach set forth above poses several problems. First, the approach would make the sort of asset acquisitions now accomplished under
section 337 less desirable than they presently are. Imposition of the corporate-level tax is, however, necessary in order to prevent a purchaser from
taking the liquidating corporation's assets with a stepped-up basis, but
without any corresponding tax on the appreciation in value of those assets.
This approach would respond to the criticism that the present system encourages sales of businesses rather than the continuation and growth of
businesses. 196 This approach might encourage use of tax-free reorganizations to accomplish sales of businesses, but acquiring corporations would
not be able to step up the basis of the acquired corporation's assets without
exposing the appreciation in the value of such assets to taxation.
Second, the approach would result in the deferral of gain recognition in
many instances, and the value of such deferral can be a great benefit to a
taxpayer. The deferral is, however, justified in the context of an in-kind
liquidation that results in the continuation of a business in unincorporated
form by the liquidated corporation's former shareholders. The rationale
justifying deferral for such liquidations is the same rationale justifying
deferral presently permitted under section 351 for newly incorporated
businesses.
Third, in the case of in-kind liquidations that result in a business operating in unincorporated form, the existence of section 1014 allows the deferred gain to be eliminated entirely upon the death of a former
shareholder. If, however, the opportunity for a step-up in basis at death is
deemed to be a problem, that problem should be addressed as a separate
issue. 197
196. See ALl PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 112; Lewis, supra note 78, at 1647.
197. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Pearlman suggested addressing this
problem by denying such assets a § 1014 basis increase, but did not explain the mechanics of
this solution. Finance Hearing on Reform of Corporate Tax, supra note 87, at 17. Perhaps,
borrowing from § 306, the proposed solution could be implemented by treating such assets
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Finally, by distinguishing between asset sales and in-kind distributions,
the approach would probably cause taxpayers to try structuring liquidations as in-kind distributions, followed closely by the sale of the distributed
assets by the shareholders. To avoid revival of the Court Holding-CumberlandPublic Service problem, 98 an asset holding period of perhaps one
year would need to be imposed. If the shareholders sold the assets during
that period, they would be responsible for paying a tax equal to the tax
that the corporation would have paid on distribution of the assets if the
liquidation had been treated as a taxable event for the distributing corporation. Such a holding period might result in a hardship to the shareholders in the event that unforeseen conditions made the sale of the business
necessary during the one-year period. The hardship problem could be resolved, at least in part, by creating a rebuttable presumption that if a sale
occurred during the holding period, the shareholders never intended to
continue the business in the unincorporated form.
Notwithstanding the problems posed above, this suggested approach
does address what arguably is the real evil created by the liquidation nonrecognition provisions: the opportunity to obtain a stepped-up asset basis
without the imposition of any tax on the accrued appreciation in asset
value. Those who advocate complete repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions as a means of accomplishing the broad reforms discussed
earlier in this Article will argue that anything less than complete repeal is
not workable. Those who are willing to recognize that complete repeal
could result in the creation of as many problems as it resolves will focus on
dealing with the real evil created by the provisions.
V.

CONCLUSION

The liquidation nonrecognition provisions have not, to this point, received proper congressional attention. Although these provisions can be
criticized on many grounds, complete repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions would work a profound change on our system of corporate
taxation. Before making any changes to Subchapter C, Congress must
identify the problems requiring resolution. The principal problem with
the liquidation nonrecognition provisions is arguably neither complexity
nor the opportunity to escape double taxation. Rather the real problem is
that the liquidation nonrecognition provisions, in combination with the
liquidation basis provisions, allow the purchaser or the distributee of a
liquidating corporation's assets to obtain a stepped-up basis in those assets
without the imposition of any corresponding tax on the accrued appreciation in those assets. New depreciation benefits, therefore, are generated
without any corresponding obligation to pay tax. If Congress will focus on
the real nature of the problems posed by the liquidation nonrecognition
as "tainted." The taint would follow the assets to prevent defeating the proposed solution by
means of a gift of such assets. Such an approach could be difficult to administer.
198. See supra notes 177 & 178 and accompanying text.
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provisions, fashioning a response that reflects both sound tax policy and
economic and business reality should be possible.
Congress must approach consideration of this problem deliberately. No
one would argue strenuously that the time has not come for a careful review of Subchapter C, to be followed by carefully crafted reform of the
Subchapter. As the Staff Report notes, the fundamental principles of the
Federal corporate income tax were being reexamined by Congress "for the
first time in 50 years." 199 Nevertheless, in the rush to address the problems
of Subchapter C, Congress should not succumb to pressure to take precipitate action. While the Senate Finance Committee Staff began studying the
possible reform of Subchapter C shortly after October 28, 1982,200 the Staff
Report and the unofficial draft legislation reflect the fact that the Staff does
not yet have the legislative proposals in final form. 20 1 Further, although
the American Law Institute has been working on its Subchapter C study
since 1974,202 the ALl Proposals reflect alternative courses of action with
20 3
no definite recommendation as to the most desirable of the alternatives.
Finally, comments on the Staff Report suggest that much work remains
2 °4
before reform legislation can be drafted and considered by Congress.
For all of these reasons, Congress should approach the reform of Subchapter C with a willingness to spend the time needed to achieve a properly crafted legislative result. The recent experience with hastily drafted
tax legislation 20 5 presents a strong argument against moving too quickly.

199. STAFF REPORT, supra note II, at 4.
200. See Statement of Sen. Robert Dole, Oct. 28, 1982, 17 TAX NOTES 494 (Nov. 8,
1982).
201. The portion of the Staff Report that deals with the repeal of the liquidation nonrecognition provisions recognizes that some relief from the effects of repeal is necessary. The
Staff Report presents five options that might be used to give relief, but does not reach any
conclusion as to which alternative is the most desirable. STAFF REPORT, supra note I1, at
93-94. The unofficial draft of proposed legislation has been characterized as "preliminary"
and "not a complete piece." See Bernick, Finance Writes PreliminaryLanguageforParts of
Sub C Plan, 22 TAX NOTES 77, 77 (Jan. 9, 1984).
202. ALl PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at I.
203. Id. at 19-20, 104.
204. See Finance Hearingon Reform of CorporateTax, supra note 87, at 17 (statement of
Ronald A. Pearlman).
205. See Surrey, Our Troubled Tax Policy.- False Routes and Proper Paths to Change,
TAX NOTES SPECIAL STUDY 9 (1981); Pierson, supra note 165.

